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Dominance of Majoritarian Politics and Hate Crimes




Using a novel state-level panel data set for the period 2009-18 on the incidence of hate
crimes in India, and a difference in difference (DD) approach, this paper investigates
the causal impact of the right-wing, Hindu nationalist BJP’s win in the 2014 national
elections on hate crimes against religious minorities. Using 2009-13 (pre-election) and
2014-18 (post-election) as the before and after periods, I estimate a standard DD model,
where the treatment group consists of states where BJP won the largest share of pop-
ular votes in 2014, to get an initial estimate of the causal impact. I strengthen this
result with a treatment intensity approach where BJP’s vote share in 2014 functions
as the treatment intensity. I instrument it with BJP’s vote share in the previous na-
tional elections in 2009 to estimate the causal impact. I supplement the linear models
with quasi-Poisson regressions to take account of the count data nature of the inci-
dence of hate crimes. All approaches show that BJP’s electoral victory in 2014 caused
an increase in the incidence of hate crimes against religious minorities. I investigate
three plausible mechanisms that might generate the result: laxity of state-level law en-
forcement; economic competition between religious groups; role of social media. I find
evidence that weakening of state-level law enforcement is the key mechanism driving
the rise in anti-minority hate crimes. This paper contributes to contemporary stud-
ies of the adverse impact of rising ethno-nationalist populism on marginalized social
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groups by investigating the case of India.
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1 Introduction
A small but growing body of scholarly work studies the connections between the recent
growth of right-wing, ethno-nationalist populism and violence against marginalized social
groups, like immigrants, and racial and religious minorities (Dancygier and Laitin, 2014;
Muis and Immerzeel, 2017; Bonikowski, 2017; Cederman, 2019). The possibility of such
connections have been commented on widely in the media in reference to the United States
after the election of Donald Trump in 2016, the 2017 Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, and
the recent growth of right-wing populist parties across Europe.1 But the scholarly literature
on this issue, especially within the discipline of economics, is still in its infancy: various
aspects of the US case have been studied by Bursztyn et al. (2017); Edwards and Rushin
(2018); Schaffner et al. (2018); Hobbs and Lajevardi (2019); Mu¨ller and Schwarz (2019);
and the UK case has been studied by Cuerden and Rogers (2018); Devine (2018); Schilter
(2019); and the case of Germany has been studied by Mu¨ller and Schwarz (2018); Entorf and
Lange (2019).2 This paper contributes to this literature by investigating the possible causal
connection between the rise of a right-wing majoritarian party in India and hate crimes
against religious minorities.
The national parliamentary elections of 2014 is seen widely as a watershed moment in
India’s post-independence history. The unprecedented and massive victory of the right-wing,
Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) marks the unmistakable rise to dominance
of a majoritarian, exclusivist politics in India (Basu, 2015; Vanaik, 2017; Bose, 2018). Com-
1See, for instance, Williams (2018); Weaver (2018); Booth (2019); Knobbe and Weidmann-Schmidt (2019).
2There is a larger literature that has studied various aspects of violence against marginalised sections of
the population upon the German unification. For instance, see Alber (1993); Krueger and Pischke (1997);
Karapin (2002); Braun and Koopmans (2010).
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mentators in national and international media, and civil society activists point to the year
2014 as also the moment, in recent history, when incidents of hate crimes against religious mi-
norities started a disturbing upward trajectory in India (Gowen and Sharma, 2018; Schultz,
2019; HRF, 2019). In this paper, I wish to study the question: is there a causal connection
between the two?
The precursor to BJP, known as the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), was formed in 1951 at
the initiative of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (national volunteer organization; RSS).
Coming out of the short-lived Janata Party experience in the late 1970s, the BJS was re-
organized as the BJP in 1980. The BJS/BJP’s electoral fortunes have fluctuated for most
of independent India’s existence - until its decisive breakthrough in the Lok Sabha (lower
house of the national parliament) elections in 2014, when it won 31.34% of the popular vote
and a majority of the constituencies (282 of the 543 parliamentary constituencies). In the
recently concluded Lok Sabha elections in 2019, the BJP has improved its already stunning
performance of 5 years ago by winning 37.36% of the popular votes and 303 parliamentary
seats.3
The BJP inherits its core political ideology of ‘Hindutva’ (roughly translated as ‘Hin-
duness’) from its progenitor, the all-male, right-wing organization, Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS). The RSS was formed in 1925 and is the primary vehicle, in Indian politics,
of an exclusionary, majoritarian vision of nationalism. Its participation in the anti-colonial
national struggle was marginal, and it’s almost sole focus has been, right from its inception,
on the differences and conflicts between Muslims and Hindus.
The political scientist, Sumantra Bose, succinctly summarises the ideology of Hindutva as
consisting of three core principles: innate unity of Hindus; India as the land of Hindus, and
not a melting pot of different cultural influences; Muslims living in India as irreconcilable
enemies of Hindudom (Bose, 2019). Founding ideologues of Hindu nationalsim, like V.
3For more details of BJP’s ideology and electoral performance see section 2.
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D. Savarkar (member and president of the Hindu Mahasabha) and M. S. Golwalkar (second
sarsangchalak, or the top leader, of the RSS), envisioned the Indian nation as formed through
centuries of cultural, social, and religious assimilation of the people living in the Indian
subcontinent. Muslims (and Christians) are excluded, in this foundational understanding of
Hindu nationalism, from the Indian nation because their religious and cultural loyalties lie
elsewhere.
While the BJP has been strategically flexible on certain important issues that defined it
in previous decades - like economic nationalism, support for a unitary state or opposition
to the accommodation of lower caste aspirations - it has never compromised on its three
core principles, including the perpetual ‘othering’ of Muslims. It is with this understanding
of BJP’s foundational principles that I approach the question of the possible link between
its rise to dominance in 2014 and the increase in hate crimes against religious minorities,
especially Muslims.
To empirically analyse the possible causal connection between the outcome of the 2014
Lok Sabha elections - which I interpret as the rise to dominance of majoritarian politics
in India - and hate crimes against religious minorities, I use a state-level panel data set,
covering the period 2009–2018. The data on religion-motivated hate crimes were collected
from the Citizen’s Religious Hate Crime Watch (CRHCW) website, and the data on electoral
outcomes is from the Election Commission of India’s website. A host of other variables have
been collected from different sources.4
I start the empirical analysis by estimating a simple difference model with state fixed
effects and dummy variables for each year in my sample. The results of this exercise shows
that average hate crimes against religious minorities did not change much between 2009
and 2013, but increased significantly in 2014 and remained high thereafter. To investigate
whether the increase in anti-minority hate crimes in 2014 can be causally linked to BJP’s
4For more details about the data, see section 3, and Appendix A and Appendix B.
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electoral victory in that year, I use a difference in difference (DD) empirical strategy.5
For the DD approach, I divide states into two groups. The treatment group - which I
call BJP States - consists of states where BJP won the largest share of popular votes in the
2014 Lok Sabha elections. The control group - which I call the non-BJP States - consists
of all other states in my sample. I compare the change in anti-minority hate crimes in the
two groups for 5 year periods before and after the 2014 Lok Sabha elections by estimating a
DD model. My definition of treatment/control groups rests on the intuition that the impact
of the rise of BJP on anti-minority hate crimes will be larger in states where the party is
stronger, i.e. where it has a larger organizational presence, where its ideology has wider
support and acceptance among the population, where anti-minority actions by its activists
might even find greater support among the functionaries of the state. And I use BJP’s
performance in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections - captured by the share of popular votes it won
- as a measure of this support.
I start the DD analysis with a specification with only state and year fixed effects, and
then incrementally add time varying controls, pre-2014 controls interacted with the after-2014
dummy and finally state-level linear time trends. All specifications show a large, positive and
statistically significant effect. For the specification with all controls and state-level linear
time trends, I find that anti-minority hate crimes increased by 544% more in the treatment
than in the control group of states (column 5, Table 7). This provides my initial estimate of
the causal impact of BJP’s electoral victory on the incidence of anti-minority hate crimes in
the period, 2009–2018.
The key identifying assumption in a DD strategy is the parallel trends assumption. In
the context of my study, this means that the incidence of anti-minority hate crimes would
move in a similar manner in both treatment and control groups of states if BJP had not
5Standard DID research designs have been widely used in economics; for instance, see Card and Krueger
(1994); Gruber (1994); Autor (2003); Muralidharan and Prakash (2017); Cengiz et al. (2019). Textbook
treatments are available in Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 227–242), and Greene (2012, chapter 6).
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won the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in the way it did. I test this key assumption both visually
(in Figure 4) and by estimating the model with the full set of controls in the pre-election
sample years, 2009–2013 (reported in Table 8). I find that average anti-minority hate crimes
in treatment (BJP States) and control (non-BJP States) groups were growing at the same
rate in the period 2009–2013. Thus, both visual and regression evidence suggests that the
parallel trends assumption is valid for my DD research strategy.
I subject my findings to further critical scrutiny by running two sets of placebo tests.
In the first placebo test, I re-estimate the DD model with full set of controls and vary the
cut-off year for defining the ‘after’ dummy variable. Since the relevant election took place
in 2014, after dummy variables defined for all other years give me placebos. I find that
there is no effect before 2014, that the effect emerges in 2014 and persists after 2014 (though
weaker in magnitude and significance; see Figure 5). This suggest that the election victory
of BJP in 2014 was the turning point as far as the incidence of anti-minority hate crimes is
concerned. For the second placebo test, I use the hate crimes against Hindus (the majority
religious community in India) as the dependent variable - with everything else remaining
the same in my DD model. Since BJP’s electoral victory signals the rise to dominance of
majoritarianism, it should not have any effect on hate crimes against member of the majority
religious community. The results of this placebo test show that there is no discernible effect
of BJP’s victory on the incidence of hate crimes against Hindus (see Table 9).
Taken together, the results from the DD estimation, the test of the parallel trends as-
sumption and the results of the two sets of placebo tests provide strong evidence of a causal
impact of BJP’s 2014 electoral victory on the incidence of anti-minority hate crimes. Strong
as this evidence is, it is still not possible to identify this as a causal impact. After all, my em-
pirical analysis is open to the following criticisms: (a) there is reverse causality running from
hate crimes to BJP’s vote share, as has been found in the case of religious riots (Wilkinson,
2004; Iyer and Shrivastava, 2018); (b) there is an unobserved factor that has caused both
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high BJP vote shares in 2014 and high anti-minority hate crimes thereafter. Since I have not
been able to rule this out, my estimates might be an overestimate of the true causal impact.
I address this concern with an instrumental variables strategy.
To implement the instrumental variables strategy, I estimate a treatment intensity model.6
In this approach, I do not divide states into two groups - the treatment and control groups
- but rather use the vote share won by BJP in 2014 itself as a measure of the ‘treatment
intensity’. Since BJP’s vote share in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections might be correlated with
unobserved factors that also increase anti-minority hate crimes in and after 2014, I am likely
to get (upward) biased estimates of the treatment effect if I estimate the model with OLS.
Hence, I use BJP’s vote share in the previous Lok Sabha elections in 2009 as the instrumental
variable for its vote share in 2014. The instrumental variable estimate with the full set of
controls is positive and statistically significant and shows that every percentage point of vote
share won by BJP in 2014 caused an increase in anti-minority hate crimes by about 2.43%
(column 5, Table 11). I also conduct the same two sets of placebo tests, as I did for the DD
model (see Table 12 and 13). The results from the placebo tests show no treatment effect
and increase the confidence in my IV results.
I complement the above results from linear models with results from count data models.
The dependent variable - the number of hate crimes faced by religious minorities - is a count
variable, which has a large probability mass concentrated at zero. Hence, I estimate the
model with a quasi-Poisson regression, which explicitly takes account of overdispersion of
the count variable. To address possible concerns of endogeneity, I estimate both a standard
quasi-Poisson regression and a quasi-Poisson model with a control function approach (to deal
with possible problems of endogeneity). Both sets of results confirm the previous results from
the linear models: there is a large and statistically significant effect of BJP’s performance
6For an example of the treatment intensity approach see Card (1992), and Angrist and Pischke (2009,
pp. 227–242).
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in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections on the incidence of hate crimes against religious minorities
(see Table 14 and 15).
After establishing the causal impact, I turn to investigating possible mechanisms that
might be responsible for the effect we observe. A survey of the existing literature on this
and similar issues suggests three possible mechanisms. First, research in political science has
identified state-level political dynamics and state-level law enforcement as important factors
that contribute to both the occurrence and prevention of religious riots in India (Brass,
2003; Wilkinson, 2004; Basu, 2015). Since law & order is a state subject in India, this makes
intuitive sense and suggests the first mechanism for me to investigate: BJP’s electoral victory
in 2014 might have weakened law enforcement at the state-level with regard to crimes against
social and religious minorities; this might have caused the spike in anti-minority hate crimes
after 2014.
An equally large body of research in history and political science, many of these based on
case studies, have highlighted the economic dimension of religious conflict in India (Engineer,
1984; Banu, 1989; Bagchi, 1990; Khan, 1992; Upadhyaya, 1992; Wilkinson, 2004). After sur-
veying some of this literature, Mitra and Ray (2014) have taken the argument a step further
by constructing a theoretical model to explain the role of economic competition in religious
conflicts like riots. Their empirical analysis shows that relative prosperity of Muslims lead to
an increase in inter-religious conflict. This suggest the second mechanism that I investigate:
BJP’s electoral victory in 2014 led to the increase in hate crimes against religious minorities,
especially Muslims, by working through the channel of economic competition between the
two groups.
The third mechanism I study comes from an engagement with a very recent literature
that has studied the role of social media in the incidence of hate crimes against minori-
ties, immigrants and other marginalized communities in the previous few years (Mu¨ller and
Schwarz, 2018, 2019; Williams et al., 2019). Using novel data sets and credible identification
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strategies, this literature has shown that social media can be the conduit for the spread of
hate-filled messaging about marginalized communities, which can then encourage or even
trigger acts of verbal or physical violence against the targeted groups. This suggests that I
study the possible role of the same mechanism in the case of anti-minority hate crimes in
India: the role of social media.
I capture the possible role of social media in generating anti-minority hate crimes by the
interaction of total wireless telecom subscriptions with the share of the Hindu population of
a state in 2011 (the latest Census year); I capture the possible role of economic competition
between Hindus and Muslims by the poverty rates of the two groups in 2009–10 and the share
of each group with higher secondary education and above, all these variables interacted
with the ‘after’ dummy variable; finally, I capture the role of state-level politics and law
enforcement with three dummy variable: a dummy that indicates whether BJP is part of
a state government in any year, a variable that measures the charge sheeting rates of all
crimes covered by the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and a third variable which measures the
charge sheeting rates of crimes committed against scheduled castes (SCs) that are covered
by the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. To test the three mechanisms, I estimate the
treatment intensity model using both OLS and IV estimators - with the full set of controls
- and include the set of variables that, in turn, capture state-level law enforcement, group-
level economic competition, and the reach of social media. My results suggest that the
state-level law enforcement mechanism is the most important one in causing the increase in
anti-minority hate crimes after 2014.
Before turning to a discussion of methods and results, I would like to highlight the two
contributions of this paper. First, I add to the recently started, and rapidly developing,
literature on the rise of right-wing populism and its impact on marginalized communities
(Bursztyn et al., 2017; Cuerden and Rogers, 2018; Devine, 2018; Edwards and Rushin, 2018;
Schaffner et al., 2018; Entorf and Lange, 2019; Hobbs and Lajevardi, 2019; Mu¨ller and
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Schwarz, 2019; Schilter, 2019). Existing studies have mostly studied developed economy
contexts, like Germany and the US, and my paper adds to this literature by offering a
similar analysis for a large developing economy, India. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the first academic study of the relationship of majoritarian politics and anti-minority
hate crimes in India.
Second, this paper speaks to a large literature that has studied various aspects of Hindu-
Muslim violence in India (Varshney, 2002; Brass, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004; Corbridge et al.,
2012; Mitra and Ray, 2014; Basu, 2015; Iyer and Shrivastava, 2018). These studies have
investigated Hindu-Muslim violence in colonial and post-colonial India that has taken the
form of riots. I extend this literature in two ways. First, I study a form of violence against
religious minorities that is different from riots, i.e. hate crimes. Second, I investigate the
causal impact of the rise of BJP on this form of violence against religious minorities.
During riots a relatively big group of members of some religious community witness large
scale violence directed against it. The resultant direct loss of life and property is relatively
large. Prominent examples of religious riots in India are: riots during the partition of the
country in 1946–47; Gujarat riots in 1969; the 1992 riots (after the demolition of the Babri
Masjid); the Gujarat riots of 2002; the Muzaffarnagar riots of 2013.7
Religion-motivated hate crimes, on the other hand, are instances of targeted mob violence
directed against an individual or family. The direct loss of life and property is far smaller
than in the case of riots. But the psychological impact on the whole community of the
victim(s) is probably equally damaging. The following list gives some prominent examples
of religion-motivated hate crimes that occurred during the period of my study.
• On the night of June 17 June, 2019, in Saraikela, Jharkhand, a 24 year old Muslim
man named Tabrez Ansari was beaten by a mob for allegedly being a thief. He was
7For detailed studies of riots, see Brass (2003); Wilkinson (2004); Basu (2015).
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humiliated and forced to chant “Jai Shri Ram”. He died in hospital a few days later.8
• On 22 June, 2017, a 16 year old Muslim boy, Junaid Khan, was stabbed on a Delhi-
Mathura train. He bled to death on platform in Asoti railway station, Faridabad.9
• On 1 April, 2017, in Alwar, Rajasthan, 55 year old cattle trader, Pehlu Khan, and his
sons were beaten by a cow vigilante mob when they were transporting cattle from a
weekly cattle market in Jaipur. Pehlu Khan died in hospital two days later.10
• On 28 September 2015, in Dadri, Uttar Pradesh, a mob attacked a 52 year old Muslim
man, Mohammad Akhlaq, and killed him over beef rumours.11
An updated version of the widely used Varshney-Wilkinson data set on religious riots
shows a decline in the incidence of such events, from the highs witnessed in the early 1990s
and the early 2000s (Basu, 2015, Figure 1.1, pp. 2). Hence, what we are witnessing since
2013 is a disturbing reversal of that trend. But, large scale riots are not the primary form
of violence committed against religious minorities in the period of my study. Rather, it
takes the form of an attack on individuals and small groups of individuals from the minority
communities - often taking the form of lynching by mobs (Bose, 2018; Gowen and Sharma,
2018; Schultz, 2019; HRF, 2019).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section 2, I provide a brief history of
Hindu nationalism to provide context for the analysis of this paper; in section 3, I discuss my
data sources and key variables; in the following section, I provide a descriptive analysis of all-
India and state-wise trends in hate crimes against religious minorities; in section 5, I present
the main empirical analysis relating to the causal impact under investigation; in section 6,
I analyse three possible mechanisms; and in section 7, I conclude the paper. Appendix A
8See the reports in Scroll and The Indian Express (accessed 24 November, 2019).
9See the report in NDTV
10See report in The Hindustan Times
11See report in Al Jazeera.
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gives details of data sources and variable definitions; and Appendix B provides discussion of
the source for my data on religion-motivated hate crimes.
2 A Brief History of Hindu Nationalism
To provide context for the analysis of this paper, I would like to present a very brief history
of the Hindu nationalist strand of politics - Hindutva - in India. Through this brief review
I would like to highlight three facts that are relevant for the analysis in this paper: (a)
the construction of Muslims (and Christians) as the ‘other’ of Hindu nationalist ideology;
(b) BJP as the representative of Hindu nationalism in the political arena; and (c) electoral
outcomes in 2014 as marking a qualitative break in the political history of Hindu nationalism
in post-independence India.12
2.1 Antecedents
The word ‘Hindu’ derives from the name of the river Indus and was used by Greeks, Romans,
and Muslims, to refer to the people living beyond that river. But, so far as we know on the
basis of historical research, the term was not used by the people themselves in any consistent
manner. Right up to the medieval period, people living beyond the river Indus were much
more likely to refer to themselves as members of specific sects than as belonging to the
Hindu fold as such. While an incipient Hindu consciousness emerged in the 17-th century
with Chhatrapati Shivaji and the Maratha confederacy (in Western parts of India), a much
more pronounced mobilization of Hindus - as a religious group - emerged only in the 19-th
century as a reaction to colonial subjugation.
12For the material in this section, I primarily use Sarkar (1984) and Jaffrelot (2007). The former is a classic
textbook on modern Indian history and the latter is an edited collection of excerpts from key writings of
Hindutva leaders and ideologues, accompanied by a very informative introduction by the editor, Christophe
Jaffrelot. In addition, I have also drawn on Andersen and Damle (1987), Jaffrelot (1996), Varshney (2002),
Brass (2003), Wilkinson (2004), McGuire and Copland (2007), Bose (2013), Basu (2015), Vanaik (2017),
Bose (2018), and Chatterjee et al. (2019).
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Contact with the British, and with Christian missionaries in particular, in the context
of colonial rule, led to an ambiguous response from local (mostly Brahmin) elite in Bengal.
While they saw in British rule a welcome development, a chance for enlightenment, they
also wanted to preserve their religious practices and culture. This ambiguous reaction first
took concrete shape in the early 19-th century as the Hindu reform movement, symbolized
most clearly by the Brahmo Samaj (founded in 1828 by the Hindu Brahmin, Raja Ram
Mohun Roy, in the Bengal Presidency to promote a rationalist and monotheistic religion).
While acknowledging the need for reform of Hinduism, Ram Mohun Roy also constructed an
image of a golden Vedic Age, pitting the spiritual superiority of this Vedic past against the
scientific superiority of contemporary Britain. By the end of the century, the Hindu reform
movement had transformed itself into an openly revivalist movement - with the founding of
the Arya Samaj in Punjab in 1875 by the wandering sanyasi from Kathiawar, Dayanand
Saraswati.
The boundaries between reform and revivalism were rather porous, so that revivalism only
emphasized elements already present, perhaps in incipient forms, in the reform movement.13
For instance, revivalism meant emphasizing an idea already implicit in the reform movement:
all problems in contemporary Hinduism that made it apparently inferior to Christianity were
later day accretions to a pristine, perfect Hinduism of yore. Dayanand Saraswati developed
this argument much further than Ram Mohun Roy, by adding cultural and social superi-
ority of the Vedic Age to its spiritual superiority that Roy had emphasized. In Dayanand
Saraswati’s writings, we find an early example of two key ideas that recur in contemporary
Hindu nationalist discourse: (a) Hindus are the autochthonous people of sacred Bharat, the
13Sumit Sarkar writes: “‘Revivalism’ thus obviously contributed to the assertion of an aggressive Hindu
identity. But one has to add that the difference here with the ‘reform’ movements was of degree rather
than kind. Not only ‘moderninstic’ trends like the Brahmos or Prarthana Samajas or the more secular
movements of Young Bengal or Vidyasagar been entirely Hindu in composition; with few exceptions, they
too had operated with a conception of ‘Muslim tyranny’ or a ‘medieval’ dark age ... from which British
rule with its accompanying alleged ‘renaissance’ or ‘awakening’ had been a deliverance.” (Sarkar, 1984,
pp.75–76).
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land lying beyond the Himalayas; (b) the caste system is a merit-based division of labour,
rather than a hereditarily transmitted system of socio-economic hierarchy. In his practical
work, Dayanand Saraswati developed the idea of ‘shuddhi’ (purification) - borrowing from
upper caste Hindu practices - to reconvert Christians back into Hinduism, which was taken
up in real earnest by his followers from 1900 onwards.
The revivalist movement found an eager audience among the non-Brahmin upper caste
Hindu trading castes in Punjab - because of its opposition to Brahminical dominance. Two
developments led to the development of an incipient organizational form and the coming
together of Arya Samajists with more traditional Hindus - known an Sanatan Dharmis. The
upper caste Hindu trading castes in Punjab had been rapidly acquiring land in rural Punjab
from the impoverished peasantry crushed under the growing burden of indebtedness. When
the colonial government passed the Punhab Alienation of Land Act in 1901 to prevent such
land transfers, the trading castes saw this as an attack on their privileges. They were further
antagonized by the British when, in 1906, Lord Minto (Viceroy and Governor-General of
India from 1905 to 1910) promised a muslim delegation that Muslims would be granted
separate electorates.14 It is in this context that the revivalist movement took an incipient
organizational shape as the Hindu Mahasabha - formed in Haridwar in 1915. But this initial
organizational attempt was largely a still born baby because of sharp differences within the
Hindu Mahasabha of its two primary ideological constituents, the Arya Samajists and the
more traditional Sanatan Dharmis (who were opposed to the reformist ideas championed by
Arya Samajis).
14This promise became a reality in 1909 with the Morley-Minto Reform (or, the Indian Council Act of
1909), which created separate electorates for Muslims so that, in these seats, only Muslims could elect
Muslims.
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2.2 Ideological and Organizational Foundations
Three developments in the 1920s signaled the founding of Hindu nationalism as an important
political strand in India. First, the still born Hindu Mahasabha got revived, as the Sanatanis
and Arya Samajis agreed to bury their differences and come together to face a common
‘enemy’ - the Muslims. The immediate context was large scale mobilization of Muslims in
the 1920s as part of the Khilafat Movement - the movement to oppose the dismantling of the
Caliphate after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. The Khilafat
movement and the spurt in religious riots in the 1920s were perceived by the Hindu revivalist
movement as a serious threat to the interests of Hindus - and mobilised them enormously.
Second, in the writings of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Hindu nationalism found its clearest
and most eloquent ideological formulation. Third, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),
the organization that would give concrete shape to Hindu nationalism in the coming decades
was formed in Nagpur in 1925 by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, a Maharashtrian Brahmin like
V.D. Savarkar.
In this foundational period of the 1920s, there was a subtle shift of emphasis in the
definition of the ‘other’ of Hindu nationalism. In the earlier reform and revivalist phases,
the primary ‘other’ was the colonial administrator and the Christian missionary - though the
series of religious riots around the issue of cow protection in the 1880s and 1890s suggests that
Muslims were already an important part of the conception of the ‘other’ that was developing
within Hindu nationalist discourse and consciousness (Sarkar, 1984, pp. 59–60, 79–80). In
the 1920s, the emphasis shifted towards the Muslim ‘other’, who was now portrayed variously
as the invader, the outsider and the prominent internal threat to the Hindu nation. While
the Christian missionary did not disappear from the list of others to deal with, the Muslim
became the primary ‘other’. This identification of the ‘other’ of Hindu nationalism remains
in force even now - and motivates the analysis in this paper.
The idea of the Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation), the establishment of which is the goal
15
of Hindu nationalism, was most cogently formulated in the 1923 book by V. D. Savarkar,
Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? For Savarkar, who wrote this book while in prison for his
anti-colonial, revolutionary activity, and much before he joined the Hindu Mahasabha or
became its president, Hindutva (roughly translated as Hinduness) is the ideology of the
Hindu nation. Savarkar conceives of the nation in cultural terms, giving impetus to the
cultural nationalism that animates Hindu nationalism to this day. Savarkar lays down four
criteria that will determine whether a person belongs to the Hindu nation: Hindu religion,
Hindu culture, Hindi (or Sanskrit) language and looking at Bharat as a sacred territory. He
is clear why Muslims and Christians cannot belong to the Hindu nation, why they are the
perpetual other:
In the case of some of our Mohammedan or Christian countrymen who had
originally been forcibly converted to a non-Hindu religion and who consequently
have inherited along with Hindus, a common Fatherland and a greater part of
the wealth of a common culture - language, law, customs, folklore, history - are
not and cannot be recognized as Hindus. For though Hindusthan to them is
Fatherland as to any other Hindus, yet it is not to them a Holyland too. Their
Holyland is far off in Arabia or Palestine. Their mythology and Godmen, ideas
and heroes are not the children of this soil. Consequently their names and their
outlook smack of a foreign origin. Their love is divided. (In V. D. Savarkar,
Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?).15
While Savarkar formulated the ideology of Hindu nationalism, its translation into concrete
activity was to be carried out most consistently and effectively by the RSS - formed by K. B.
Hedgewar in 1925. For the first few decades, the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha co-existed
as two important organizational forms of Hindu nationalism - with subtle differences between
the two - but after independence, and the tragic death of S. P. Mookherjee (the president
15Cited in Jaffrelot (2007, pp. 95).
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of the Hindu Mahasabha) in 1953, the RSS completely eclipsed the Hindu Mahasabha and
became the pre-eminent organization of Hindu nationalism. Over the years, the RSS has
formed a whole series of organizations, which are together known as the Sangh Parivar
(roughly translated as the family of the Sangh), and which permeates the social and political
life of the country. This includes the student front, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad
(ABVP), formed in 1948; the tribal movement, Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA), formed in
1952; the trade union, Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), formed in 1955; the world council
of Hindus, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), formed in 1964; the Vidya Bharati, formed in
1977 to coordinate a network of schools first developed in the 1950s; among many others.
2.3 Hindu Nationalism in the Political Arena
Hindu nationalism found expression in the political arena with the formation in 1951, just
before the first general elections in independent India, of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS).
The BJS was formed by the RSS, and in its initial years, accommodated political strands
coming both from the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS. But after the death of S. P. Mookher-
jee in 1953 (the president of the Hindu Mahasabha), the BJS was completely dominated by
the RSS. The BJS was active in electoral politics from 1951 to 1977. It merged with the
Janata Party in 1977. When the Janata Party experiment collapsed due to contradictions
between its constituent parts (the socialists and the RSS members), former BJS members
regrouped as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980. From 1980, the BJP has been the
political representative of Hindu nationalism in Indian politics.
To gauge the strength of its presence in the political arena, let us turn to Figure 1, which
plots the share of seats and share of popular votes won by the Hindutva strand of politics,
i.e. BJS before 1977 and BJP after 1980, in the Lok Sabha elections in post-independence
India.16 From the figure, we can see that the rise to political dominance of Hindutva displays
16All figures in this paper have been created with the package ggplot2 in R (Wickham, 2016).
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a two-step pattern. The BJS was a marginal presence in the electoral landscape, never able
to cross 10% of the popular votes cast, or seats contested, in Lok Sabha elections. Hindutva’s
political rise only begins in its incarnation as the BJP. BJP’s political fortunes takes two
significant leaps. In the early 1990s, the BJP won more than 20% of seats in the Lok Sabha
for the first time. It consolidated its position and increased its political presence significantly
in 2014 by winning more than 30% of the popular votes and a majority of seats in the Lok
Sabha - for the first time in its history.
The electoral outcome in 2014 marks a turning point, a qualitative shift, in the political
history of Hindu nationalism. While the BJP had emerged as the largest political party in
the Lok Sabha in the 1996 elections, it did not come even close to winning a majority of
seats. This meant that it had to form alliances with other parties to govern at the Central
level - which it did for five years between 1999 and 2004 - and thus could not pursue its core
agenda items. It is only in 2014 that the BJP won, for the first time, a majority of seats in
the Lok Sabha, dispensing with the need to rely on allies to run the central government.
3 Data: Sources and Key Variables
For the analysis reported in this paper, I have constructed a state-level panel data set which
has information on 28 states (27 states and the nation capital territory of Delhi) for the years
2009 to 2018, giving me a total of 280 state-year observations.17 The two key variables in my
data set are the incidence of religion-motivated hate crimes and the electoral performance of
the BJP. The former is the outcome variable of interest and the latter is used to construct
the treatment group (of states) and treatment intensity (across states). The panel data set
17The 28 states included in my sample together accounted for more than 99% of India’s population in 2011.
I have excluded the state of Arunachal Pradesh and the 6 remaining union territories from my analysis. The
state of Telengana was formed out of Andhra Pradesh in June, 2014. For the years 2014 and after, I have
absorbed Telengana’s data into the composite state of Andhra Pradesh to facilitate comparison over time.
Where relevant, I have used population weighted values of variables for Telengana and Andhra Pradesh to











































Figure 1: Performance of the Hindutva strand of politics in elections to the Lok Sabha (lower
house of parliament) in post-Independence India. Before 1980, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh was
the political representative of Hindutva in the electoral arena; after 1980, it was the Bharatiya
Janata Party. SeatShare refers to the share of seats won in the Lok Sabha; and VoteShare
denotes the share of popular votes won in the Lok Sabha elections. The horizontal axis gives
the years in which the Lok Sabha elections took place. Source: Author’s calculation from data
accessed from the website of the Election Commission of India: https: // eci. gov. in/ .
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also includes other covariates that are either used as controls in the main regressions or for
testing mechanisms.
3.1 Anti-Minority Hate Crimes
I have collected data on the incidence of anti-minority hate crimes from the website: Citizen’s
Religious Hate Crime Watch (CRHCW).18 CRHCW is an independent citizen’s initiative to
collect data on and highlight patterns of hate crimes against religious minorities in India.
The initiative was started in 2018 and, in recognition of its stellar work, was awarded the
Data Journalism Award of the Year in 2019. Data from CRHCW has been used widely by
national and international media, including the Hindu, The Wire, Washington Post, New
York Times, Al Jazeera, New Yorker and BBC.
The CRHCW defines a religion-motivated hate crime in the way that is standard in the
extant sociological literature. In particular, a religion-motivated hate crime is an incident
with two characteristics - first, that it is a prima facie criminal act, under the provisions
of the Indian legal system, and second, that it is partly or wholly motivated by prejudice
towards the religious identity of the victim.19 The main source of data on religion-motivated
hate crimes recorded by the CRHCW are news reports in the national media.20 Starting
from reports about such incidents in English language online and print media, the CRHCW
18I accessed https://p.factchecker.in/ between July 10 and 15 in 2019 to put together my data set on
the incidence of hate crimes in India. The data is no longer available in the public domain. It was reported
in the media that the website had been pulled down on September 1, 2019 (Scroll, 2019). For further details,
see Appendix A.
19The FBI defines a hate crime as any “criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole
or in part by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or
gender identity.” See the FBI website here.
20There is a long tradition in the social sciences of using data on violence against marginalized communities
collected from news reports. For an example of the use of this methodology in economics, and references
to other disciplines which have used this method of data collection and analysis, see Krueger and Pischke
(1997). In studies of religious riots in India, the primary data set is the Varshney-Wilkinson data set, which
was constructed from reports in the Bombay (Mumbai) edition of the leading English language daily, The
Times of India. Among many other studies, Mitra and Ray (2014) has used the Varshney-Wilkinson data
set.
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did a careful analysis - with the help of legal experts - to make sure an incident qualifies as
a hate crime. A subsequent round of fact checking was done - using other media, especially
vernacular, sources - to corroborate important details and uncover other aspects of the
incident that might have been missed out. Using this methodology, the CRHCW collected
data on religion-motivated hate crimes in India going back to the year 2009.21
For the analysis reported in this paper, I collected data on the number of hate crimes
by state-year from the CRHCW website. I have separately recorded information about the
number of hate crimes committed against the following exhaustive (and mutually exclusive)
religious community groupings: Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Unknown.22 In
India, Hindus are the majority religious community, and Muslims, Christians and Sikhs are
the main minority religious communities. By aggregating the number of hate crimes across
all these religious groups, I get the total number of religion-motivated crimes for a state-
year observation; and, by aggregating across Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, I get the total
number of hate crimes against religious minorities for a state-year observation.
I have made one important adjustment to the hate crime count for the years 2013 and
2014. I count the number of hate crimes for the year 2014 as only those incidents that
happened after the month of May in 2014; incidents that happened before May are recorded
in the count for the previous year, 2013. This adjustment is motivated by the primary
question investigated in this paper: the effect of the parliamentary elections on anti-minority
hate crimes. Since the results of the parliamentary elections were declared in May 2014, I
include incidents that occurred after May as part of the count of hate crimes for the year
21For further details about the methodology used, see Appendix B and https://datajournalismawards.
org/projects/hate-crime-watch/
22In a few cases, victims included members from more than one community. In these cases, I have counted
the incident for the category of the minority community involved. This is motivated by the understanding
that minority community members are more vulnerable than their majority community counterparts. An
alternative would be to count the incident under both community categories. But this latter strategy would
mean that each incident be counted multiple times. Since my main outcome variable is the number of
incidents and since I am mainly interested in the impact on minority communities, I have opted for the first
method.
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2014 - to isolate the impact of the electoral outcome on subsequent hate crimes.
3.2 Electoral Outcome and Treatment
I use state-level outcomes of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections to construct treatment groups
(of states) and to measure treatment intensity (across states). The key electoral outcome
variable that I have used is the share of popular vote won by BJP, and other political parties,
for the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in India. I have downloaded this data from the website of
the Election Commission of India.23
Using these data, I define the treatment group as those states where BJP was the largest
political party according to popular votes won in the 2014 Lok Sabha election; the control
group consists of all other states in my sample. Note that in constructing this treatment
dummy variable, I am comparing the vote share won by BJP with the vote share won by all
other parties. For states where the BJP emerges as the party with the largest vote share,
the treatment dummy variable takes the value 1, and it takes the value 0 otherwise. This
comparison-based definition of the treatment dummy means that it can take the value 1
for very different magnitudes of vote share won by the BJP across states. What matters is
whether it was largest among all political parties. For instance, we can see in Table 4 that
Rajasthan and Haryana are both in the treatment group - even though the vote share won
by BJP in these two states were quite different: 56% in Rajasthan and 35% in Haryana.
In a standard DID research design, the population (in this case Indian states) is divided
into two groups - the treatment and control group. I will complement the standard DID
analysis with a treatment intensity approach. For this latter approach, I use the share of
23An alternative measure that recommends itself is the share of seats won by the BJP. In India’s electoral
system, winners are decided by the ‘first past the post’ rule. Hence, the outcome in terms of which party wins
a seat depends not only its vote share but on many other factors, including the number of key contestants,
pre-poll alliances, etc. The vote share gives a direct measure of support for a party, which is not mapped
in a straightforward fashion onto seat share. Hence, I prefer to use the vote share for my study to capture
the level of support of the BJP in a state. The electoral data in available here: https://eci.gov.in/
statistical-report/statistical-reports/
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popular votes won by the BJP in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections as the treatment intensity
variable - which captures the strength of BJP’s support. For arriving at reliable causal
estimates, I will use BJP’s vote share in the previous Lok Sabha elections in 2009 as an
instrumental variable for its vote share in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections (the treatment
intensity variable). I will discuss the plausibility of this instrument below.
3.3 Other Covariates
To facilitate comparisons between treatment and control groups (of States), I need to ensure
that they are reasonably similar. To do so, I include the following covariates as control
variables in my regression models: incidence of IPC crimes, mid-year population, real per
capita net state domestic product, share of population that is literate, share of population
residing in urban areas, and the share of Muslims in a state’s population. Among these
covariates, data on the incidence of crimes, state-level population and per capita real net
domestic product is available for every year. On the other hand, data on the share of
population that is literate, share of population residing in urban areas, and the share of
Muslims in a state’s population is only available for 2011 (the census year). Hence, when
I include these three covariates, I interact them with the after-2014 dummy variable (that
identifies years after the 2014 Lok Sabha elections).
In addition, I use the following variables for testing three mechanisms (which I discuss in
greater detail below): poverty rate (HCR) of Muslims; poverty rate of Hindus; proportion
of Muslims with higher secondary education and above; proportion of Hindus with higher
secondary education and above; the charge sheeting rate of IPC crimes; the charge sheeting
rate of crimes against SCs that are covered by the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989; the total number of wireless telecom subscribers; and a dummy variable indicating
whether BJP is part of the State government in any year (Yes=1;No=0). Summary statistics
23
of all variables used for the analysis in this paper are presented in Table 1.24
4 A Descriptive Analysis of Hate Crimes
I begin my analysis by discussing overall trends - both at the all-India level and at state-levels
- about the prevalence of hate crimes against religious minorities between 2009 and 2018.
4.1 All India Pattern
Table 2, 3 and Figure 2 summarize information about hate crimes against religious minori-
ties, for all religious communities, and the difference in hate crimes faced by minorities and
the majority (Hindus), at the all-India level for the period of analysis, 2009–2018. From
Table 2 and Figure 2, we see a significant increase in the incidence of hate crimes against
religious minorities in India and also an equally steep increase in the difference in hate
crimes faced by minorities and the majority (Hindus), especially since 2013. Thus, not only
have hate crimes increased against religious minorities, it has also increased significantly in
comparison to hate crimes against members of the majority community (Hindus).
In Table 3, I have summarized information on hate crimes for two periods that I will
use for my econometric analysis. The first period runs from 2009 to 2013, and includes the
months from January to May of 2014. Hence this first period refers to the roughly 5-year
period before the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. The second period covers the period since the
results for the 2014 Lok Sabha elections were declared in mid-May of 2014 and runs up to
the end of 2018. Thus, in Table 3 I have information on two periods of roughly equal length,
before and after the declaration of results of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, for comparison.
For the whole period of analysis covered in this paper, 2009–2018, there was a total of 275


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Total Number of Religion-motivated Hate Crimes by Community of Victims
in India, 2009–18a
Community of Victims All All Minorities
Muslim Christian Sikh Hindu Unknown Minorities Less Hindus
2009 1 2 0 0 0 3 3
2010 3 5 0 0 0 8 8
2011 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
2012 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
2013 4 5 0 1 1 9 8
2014 6 2 0 1 7 8 7
2015 21 1 0 4 4 22 18
2016 28 9 2 1 2 39 38
2017 58 5 0 3 5 63 60
2018 49 12 2 17 12 63 46
a This table gives total number of hate crimes by community of victim for all years in my
sample, 2009–2018. In this table, religious minorities include Muslims, Christians and Sikhs.
Hindus are the majority religious community. Source: Author’s calculation from data
accessed from the following website: https://p.factchecker.in/
religious hate crimes, of which 217, or 80 percent, were hate crimes committed against reli-
gious minorities (Muslims, Christians and Sikhs).25 Of the total hate crimes against religious
minorities, 78.34 percent were against Muslims, 19.35 percent were against Christians and 2.3
percent were against Sikhs. In the 5-year period before the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, there
were a total of 22 hate crimes against religious minorities, which were distributed across re-
ligious groups as follows: Muslims (36.36%), Christians (59.09%), and Sikhs (4.55%). Thus,
Christians mainly bore the main brunt of hate crimes during this period, 2009–2013.
The picture changes dramatically in the next 5-year period, both in terms of the magni-
25To get a sense of magnitudes, it is useful to compare the incidence of religion-motivated hate crimes with
the incidence of Hindu-Muslim riots using the Varshney-Wilkinson data set. Between 1950 and 1995, there
were a toal of 1200 riots. Between 1950 and 1981, the average number of riots in India was 16 per year;
this increased to more than 48 per year between 1982 and 1995 (Mitra and Ray, 2014, pp. 734). Between
2014 and 2018, the average number of hate crimes against religious minorities was 39 per year. Thus, the
incidence of hate crimes against religious minorities and Hindu-Muslim riots for the two periods that saw
high incidence of both - 2014-18 for the former and 1982-95 for the latter - are comparable. But as I have
pointed out earlier, the casualties in riots are much higher, even though the psychological impacts of both
might be comparable.
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Table 3: Total Number of Religion-motivated Hate Crimes
in India, 2009–18a
2009–2013 2014–2018






All Religious Minorities 22 195
Minorities less Hindus 21 169
a This table reports basic facts pertaining to the incidence of
anti-minority hate crimes in India between 2009 and 2018. The
number for 2014 only counts incidents that occurred after May,
2014; incidents that occured between January and May 2014 are
included in the number for 2013. This facilitates a clean
comparison before and after the results for the 2014 Lok Sabha
elections were declared in May 2014. Source: Author’s calculation
from data accessed here https://p.factchecker.in/
tude and distribution across communities. Between June, 2014 and the end of 2018, a total
of 195 hate crimes were committed against religious minorities, an increase of 786 percent
from the 5-year period before the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. In this post-election period,
the incidence of hate crimes against religious minorities were distributed as follows: Muslims
(83.08%), Christians (14.87%), and Sikhs (2.05%). The vast majority of hate crimes are
now committed against Muslims, whereas both Christians and Sikhs see a decline in the
proportion of hate crimes targeting them.
While the main issue investigated in this paper is hate crimes against religious minorities,
I would also like to note, for the sake of completeness, that there has been some increase
in the incidence of hate crimes against the majority religious community - Hindus - too
(especially between 2017 and 2018). In the period 2009–13, Hindus were victims in 4.17%
of hate crimes; in the period 2014–18, 10.36% of hate crimes were committed against them.














































Figure 2: Total number of hate crimes against religious minorities (Muslims, Christians,
and Sikhs) and against Muslims in India, 2009–2018. Source: Author’s calculation from
data accessed from the CRHCW website: https: // p. factchecker. in/ .
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of those faced by Christians and are far lower than what is faced by Muslims. Only when we
recall that Christians comprise 2% of India’s population (but face 11.55% of all hate crimes
in the period 2014–18) and Muslims comprise 14% of India’s population (but face 64.54%
of all hate crimes in the period 2014–18), can we put these numbers in proper perspective.
Even as we witness a rise in hate crimes against all communities, the overwhelming majority
of hate crimes target religious minorities.
One way to note this is to study the trend of the difference in hate crimes faced by religious
minorities and the majority community (Hindus). Over the whole period, there were 190
hate crimes against minorities over and above the 27 incidents against Hindus. In the pre-
election period, 2009–13, minorities faced 21 more hate crimes incidents than Hindus; in the
post-election period, 2014–18, there were 169 more hate crime incidents against minorities
than against Hindus. Thus, the data in Table 2 and 3 and Figure 2, show not only an
increase in the overall number of hate crimes in India since 2013, but an increase in hate
crimes disproportionately targeting religious minorities.
4.2 State-wise Patterns
The all-India pattern discussed above hides wide variation across states, and now I turn to a
discussion of that. Using data from my sample, Table 4 summarizes two types of facts: (a)
basic facts relating to hate crimes against religious minorities across Indian states, and (b)
electoral performance of BJP in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.
The top 10 states in terms of the total number of incidents of hate crimes against religious
minorities between 2009 and 2018 were, in descending order: Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan,
Karnataka, Haryana, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Bihar, NCT of Delhi, and Jammu
and Kashmir (and Madhya Pradesh). These states are also the top 10 states in terms of
the number of hate crimes between 2014 and 2018 (the only difference being a change in the
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Table 4: Hate Crimes Against Religious Minorities across Indian States,
2009–18a
State Hate Crimes Hate Crimes BJP Vote
(2009–13) (2014–18) Share, 2014 (%)
1 Uttar Pradesh 2 45 42.63
2 Rajasthan 2 20 55.61
3 Karnataka 3 15 43.37
4 Haryana 1 13 34.84
5 Jharkhand 0 13 40.71
6 Gujarat 0 11 60.11
7 Bihar 0 10 29.86
8 Maharashtra 2 10 27.56
9 NCT of Delhi 0 10 46.63
10 Jammu and Kashmir 0 8 32.65
11 Madhya Pradesh 0 8 54.76
12 Andhra Pradesh 8 6 8.52
13 Tamil Nadu 0 5 5.56
14 West Bengal 1 5 17.02
15 Manipur 0 3 11.98
16 Punjab 1 3 8.77
17 Uttarakhand 0 3 55.93
18 Assam 0 2 36.86
19 Chhattisgarh 0 2 49.66
20 Kerala 1 2 10.45
21 Himachal Pradesh 1 1 53.85
22 Goa 0 0 54.12
23 Meghalaya 0 0 9.16
24 Mizoram 0 0 0
25 Nagaland 0 0 0
26 Odisha 0 0 21.88
27 Sikkim 0 0 2.39
28 Tripura 0 0 5.77
a This table reports basic facts pertaining to the incidence of hate crimes against
religious minorities across Indian states between 2009 and 2018. The number for
2014–18 counts all incidents that occurred after May, 2014; incidents that occured
between January and May 2014 are included in the number for 2009–13. This
facilitates a clean comparison before and after the results for the 2014 Lok Sabha
elections were declared. In the last column, I report the share of popular votes won
by BJP in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. Source: Author’s calculation using data
from the CRHCW website: https://p.factchecker.in/
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ranking of Bihar and Maharashtra). When we turn to BJP’s electoral performance in 2014,
we notice that all these states have also had significant political presence of the BJP. Hence,
this suggests a possible link between the political dominance of BJP and incidence of hate
crimes against religious minorities. I investigate the evidence in favour of this possible link
in the rest of the paper.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Simple Difference Model
I begin my empirical analysis by estimating a simple difference model:
log(0.1 + hcst) = µs +
k=2018∑
k=2010
δtDt + εst (1)
where s, t are indexes for states and year, hcst is number of anti-minority hate crimes in state s
in year t, Dt is dummy variable for year t, where t = 2010, 2011, . . . , 2018, µs is an unobserved
time-constant state-level effect. My primary interest is in the coefficients associated with
the year dummy variables (the reference dummy variable is for the year 2009), which show
if there is a difference in the average incidence of anti-minority hate crimes in comparison to
its incidence in 2009 even after accounting for time-constant state-level unobserved factors.26
In Figure 3, I plot the coefficient estimates, along with 95% confidence intervals, of
δ2010, δ2011, . . . , δ2018. From Figure 3 we see that the coefficient on the year dummy variable
for 2014 onwards is positive and significant. The coefficients on the dummy variables for
the years before 2014 are either negative (and insignificant) or positive (but insignificant).
We can conclude that average anti-minority hate crimes did not vary much between 2009
26In defining the dependent variable in my regression models, I follow Mitra and Ray (2014) and add
a small number, 0.1, to the number of hate crimes to avoid losing observations because many state-year
observations have 0 hate crimes.
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and 2013, and that there is a sustained increase in hate crimes since 2014. To investigate
the possibility that this increase is caused by BJP’s electoral performance in 2014, I will use
variation across states, summarised in Table 4, in a DD research design.
5.2 Difference in Difference
5.2.1 Motivation and Set-Up
As a first approach to the question of causation, I will compare the difference in the average
incidence of hate crimes in treatment and control groups before and after 2014. The treat-
ment group consists of all states where BJP emerged as the largest party in terms of popular
votes in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections; I call these the “BJP States”. The control group
consists of all other states in my sample; I call these the “Non-BJP States”. Table 5 pro-
vides sample means and differences in means of the incidence of hate crimes against religious
minorities for the two groups. In the control group, the average incidence of anti-minority
hate crimes increased from 0.183 before the elections (2009–13), to 0.4 after the elections
(2014–18). In the treatment groups, the corresponding increase was from 0.138 before the
elections to 2.14 after the elections. The increase in the treatment group over and above the
increase in the control group was 1.785. Compared to the average incidence in either group
before the election, this difference-in-difference, of 1.785, seems to be significantly large.
To get a firmer estimate, along with confidence intervals, of the simple difference-in-
difference of anti-minority hate crimes I will estimate a DD model:
log (0.1 + hst) = β1 (BJPs × Aftert) +X ′stλ+ µ0s + µ1st+ δt + εst (2)
where s = 1, 2, . . . , 28 and t = 2009, 2010, . . . , 2018 index states and years, respectively, hst























Figure 3: Parameter estimates on year dummy variables in a simple difference model in (1)
with 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable is log(0.1 + hcst), where hcst is the
number of hate crimes against religious minorities in state s and year t. The model includes
state fixed effects (but no controls) and is estimated on the state-level panel data set described
in section 3.
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Table 5: Average Religion-motivated Hate Crimes Against Re-
ligious Minorities in BJP and non-BJP Statesa
2009–2013 2014–2018 Difference
BJP States 0.138 2.140 2.002
Non-BJP States 0.183 0.400 0.217
Difference in Difference 1.785
a Average anti-minority hate crimes in India between 2009 and 2018.
The number for 2014 only counts incidents that occurred after May,
2014; incidents that occured between January and May 2014 are
included in the number for 2013. Source: Author’s calculation using
data from the CRHCW website: https://p.factchecker.in/
for state s if BJP was the largest political party by popular vote in the 2014 Lok Sabha
elections, and 0 otherwise, Aftert = 1 for all years 2014 and after, i.e. for t ≥ 2014,
and 0 otherwise, Xst is a vector of controls, µ0s is a state fixed effect, µ1st denote state-
specific linear time trends, δt is a year fixed effect and εst is an idiosyncratic error. The
coefficient of interest is β1, which will be an estimate of the causal impact of BJP’s political
dominance on the incidence of hate crimes against religious minorities. In this model, β1 is
the percentage difference in the number of hate crimes in the treatment group (states where
BJP is dominant) versus the control group (states where BJP is not dominant) before and
after the 2014 elections.
5.2.2 How Similar are the Two Groups Before 2014?
Before I present regression results, I wish to probe an initial question that makes the DD
approach plausible: how similar are the two groups - treatment and control - before 2014?
In Table 6, I present sample means of all variables used for the analysis in this paper for
the period before 2014. The first column gives the sample mean of variables for the control
group (Non-BJP States), the second column gives the corresponding sample mean for the
treatment group (BJP States) and the last column reports the p-value for testing the null
hypothesis that the sample means are the same for both groups. At this point, I would like
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Table 6: Difference in Mean in BJP and non-BJP States Before 2014a
Non-BJP BJP p-value
Hate crimes against rel minorities 0.18 0.14 0.69
BJP’s vote share in 2014 8.46 44.95 0
BJP’s vote share in 2009 5.01 31.29 0
Log-Crime Incidence (number) 9.61 10.98 0
Log-PCNSDP (2012-13 rupess) 10.89 10.89 0.98
Log Mid-year Population (lakhs) 4.58 5.73 0
Share of Urban Population in 2011 33.25 33.52 0.97
Literacy Rate in 2011 79.75 74.30 0.08
Share of Muslim Population in 2011 8.33 15.62 0.14
Chargesheeting rate for All crimes 73.04 72.75 0.93
Chargesheeting rate Crimes against SCs 87.57 87.85 0.92
Wireless telecom subscribers (million) 6.59 5.76 0.16
BJP in State Govt (Yes=1;No=0) 0.08 0.35 0
Hghr Scndry and Above for Hindus in 2011-12 20.43 21.48 0.73
Hghr Scndry and Above for Muslims in 2011-12 13.73 11.04 0.24
Poverty among Hindus in 2009–10 21.67 32.95 0.04
Poverty among Muslims in 2009–10 22.43 36.05 0.04
a This table reports the sample mean of covariates for the control (non-BJP) and
treatment (BJP) groups of states. The treatment group consists of 16 states where BJP
emerged as the largest political party (by share of popular votes) in the 2014 Lok Sabha
elections. The other 12 states in my sample form the control group. For definitions of
variables and sources, see Appendix A.
to comment on the variables in the top two panels - I will return to the bottom panel when
I study mechanisms (section 6).
From the top panel, we see that the average number of anti-minority hate crimes is not
significantly different in the treatment group (0.14) compared to the control group (0.18).
The p-value of the test of equality of means is 0.69. This is important because it means that
the DD estimates will not be overly responsive to functional forms used. We also see that
the share of popular votes won by BJP, in both the 2009 and the 2014 Lok Sabha elections,
is significantly higher in the treatment, as compared to, the control group. For the 2014
elections, the average of the vote share won by BJP in the treatment group was 44.95% and
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in the control group was 8.46%. The difference of more than 36% is highly significant.
The middle panel in Table 6 contains the variables I use as controls in my regression -
drawing on existing literature on religious conflicts in India (Jha, 2013; Mitra and Ray, 2014;
Iyer and Shrivastava, 2018). From this panel, we see that the two groups are significantly
different in terms of crime incidence (with the treatment group having higher incidence) and
population (with the treatment group being larger), but are similar in terms of per capita
net state domestic product (in constant prices). We also see that the two groups differ in
terms of the literacy rate - with the control group being more literate than the control group.
But the two groups are not significantly different in terms of either the urbanization rate or
the share of Muslims in the state’s population.
The picture that emerges from the data in Table 6 is that the two groups are significantly
different in several variables that are relevant for explaining the incidence of hate crimes
against religious minorities. Hence, it is important to control these variables: crime incidence,
literacy rate. While sample means of the other variables in the middle panel of Table 6 are not
significantly different among the two groups, I will follow the existing literature in including
them as controls. But data availability forces me to treat some of these variables differently.
While data on per capita net state domestic product (PCNSDP) and population are
available for all years, I have data on the other three variables listed in the middle panel -
urbanization, literacy and share of Muslims - only for Census years. I use their values for
2011, which is the latest Census year for which data is available. I include the log of PCNSDP
and population as controls by themselves, but when I include urbanization, literacy and share
of Muslims in the regression models, I interact them with the Aftert dummy variable.
The crime incidence variable is especially important for my analysis. If hate crimes are
rising along with general crimes, then it will be difficult to ascribe the rise in the former to the
2014 electoral outcomes. Hence, it is important to control for the evolution of the incidence
of general crimes. It can capture important trends in the treatment and control groups, as
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far as the incidence of hate crimes is concerned, that is necessary to control for the validity of
the DD approach. The problem I face with this variable is that it is not available for 2017 and
2018. Hence I estimate some specifications with this important variable included - but with
a smaller sample size - and also use state-specific linear time trends - with a larger sample
size - as an alternative strategy to control for possibly confounding trends. Hence, all models
are estimated, among other specifications, with two important alternatives, the first with
log of crime incidence (but without state-specific trends) and the other with state-specific
trends (but without log crime incidence).
5.2.3 DD Results
Table 7 presents results of estimating the DD model in (2) with OLS.27 I report the coefficient
on the interaction of the treatment dummy, BJPs (whether BJP won the largest share of
popular votes in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in state s) and the ‘After’ dummy variables for
four specifications. In the first specification (column 1), the model includes state and year
fixed effects. State fixed effects control for unobserved state-specific factors, like history of
Hindu-Muslim violence (see Mitra and Ray (2014, Table I).), and year fixed effects control
for common shocks to all states. In the second specification (column 2), I add time two
varying controls (log PCNSDP, log population) because existing studies have shown the
importance of economic factors like income in determining religious conflict and violence
(Jha, 2013; Mitra and Ray, 2014; Iyer and Shrivastava, 2018); in the third specification
(column 3), I add three pre-2014 controls (share of urban population, share of Muslims,
and literacy rate, all measured in the Census year 2011) interacted with the Aftert dummy
variable; in the fourth specification (column 4), I add log incidence of crime; and in the final
specification (column 5), I add state-specific linear time trends (but exclude log incidence
of crime). Standard errors are always clustered by state to address possible problems of
27I use the LSDV estimator, i.e., I use the full set of state and year dummy variables and estimate the
model with OLS.
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Table 7: Estimates of Treatment Effect from DD Model with Hate Crimes
Against Religious Minoritiesa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AftertXBJPs 1.455
∗∗∗ 1.411∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗∗ 1.116∗∗∗ 1.862∗∗
(0.308) (0.291) (0.379) (0.388) (0.732)
Observations 280 252 252 224 252
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time-Varying Controls Y Y Y Y
Pre-Treatment Controls Y Y Y
Log-Crime Incidence Y
State Specific Trends Y
a OLS estimates of the treatment effect from the DD model in (2). The dependent
variable is log(0.1 + hcst), where hcst is the number of hate crimes against religious
minorities in state s and year t. BJPs is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
states where BJP won the largest share of popular votes in the 2014 Lok Sabha
elections, and 0 otherwise; Aftert is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
t ≥ 2014, and 0 otherwise. Time varying controls: log population, log per capita real
net state domestic product. Pre-treatment controls (interacted with Aftert): urban
population share, literacy rate, share of Muslim population, all measured in 2011.
Standard errors are clustered by state and appear in parentheses below parameter
estimates. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent; ∗ 10 percent. The
model was estimated with the lm.cluster() function from the miceadds package
(Robitzsch and Grund, 2019).
inference arising from within-state serial correlations of the error term (Bertrand et al.,
2004).
In Table 7 we see that the estimates of the treatment effect are positive and significant
in all specifications. The magnitude of the estimate declines as we add controls, but then
increases sharply in column 5, when I add state-specific linear time trends. The magnitude
of the coefficient in column 5 suggests that the causal impact of BJP’s political dominance
on the incidence of hate crimes against religious minorities is very large, at about 544%
(= 100 ∗ (exp(1.862) − 1)). This means that, on average, BJP’s victory increased anti-
minority hate crimes by 544% in the treatment group over and above the change in the
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control group. If we instead use the estimate from the model with log crime incidence (but
without state-specific trends) in column 4, we get an effect of 206% (= 100∗(exp(1.116)−1)).
In either case, the effect is large and statistically significant at standard levels of significance.
This provides initial estimates of the causal impact of BJP’s electoral victory in 2014 on the
incidence of anti-minority hate crimes. To asses the validity of the DD estimates of the causal
impact under investigation, I would like to investigate if the parallel trends assumption, the
key identifying assumption in the DD approach, is valid?
5.2.4 Parallel Trends Before 2014?
The key identification assumption in the DD research design is the parallel trends assump-
tion. This translates to the claim that absent intervention, in this case BJP’s electoral
victory in 2014, the incidence of anti-minority hate crimes in both treatment and control
groups would move in a similar manner. In effect the Non-BJP states provide the counter-
factual trajectory of the incidence of anti-minority hate crimes. While there is no way to
test this directly, it is possible to provide some indirect evidence for this.
The first piece of evidence of parallel trends is visual and is summarized in Figure 4.
In this figure, we have time series plots of the average of log(0.1 + hcst), where hcst is the
number of anti-minority hate crimes in state s in year t, for the treatment and control
groups. A vertical line at year 2013 separates out the pre-election and post-election 5 year
periods. From the figure we see that the average of log(0.1 + hcst) moved similarly in both
groups before 2014. While there in an increase in hate crimes in both groups from 2014, the
treatment group (BJP States) shows a relatively larger increase. From this visual evidence,
we can conclude that the parallel trend assumption seems to be valid before 2014, and that
there is a divergence since then (which is what the DD approach wishes to estimate).












































Non−BJP States BJP States
Figure 4: The figure plots the average of log(0.1+hcst) per year in the treatment group (BJP
states; dotted line) and the control group (non-BJP states; solid line) between 2009 and
2018, where hcst is the number of anti-minority hate crimes. The treatment group consists
of states where BJP was the largest political party by share of the popular vote in the Lok
Sabha elections of 2014; the control group consists of all other states. The red vertical line
represents the year 2013, and demarcates the pre-election and post-election periods.
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and Prakash (2017), by estimating the following model on the sample for 2009–13:
log(0.1 + hcst) = α + β0(Y EARt ∗BJPs) + µs + δt + CONTROLS + εst (3)
where Y EARt is a linear time trend, BJPs is 1 for BJP states (largest party in 2014), and
the model includes unobserved year and state fixed effects and control variables. My interest
is in the coefficient, α, which will allows us to test if average anti-minority hate crimes in the
treatment group (BJP states) is growing faster than in the control group (non-BJP states)
for the period before the 2014 elections, i.e. 2009–2013.
Table 8 presents estimates of α, with standard errors clustered by state appearing in
parentheses below the estimate, for three specification of the model in (3). In column 1 of
Table 8, the model includes state and year fixed effects; in column 2, I add time-varying
controls, including the log of crime incidence; in column 3, I add state-specific time trends.
The parameter estimates in all the columns are negative, suggesting that the incidence of
anti-minority hate crimes was growing at a slower rate in the treatment group.
If we take the last column’s result, then we conclude that average anti-minority hate
crimes in BJP states is growing at a slower rate than in non-BJP states in the period 2009–
2013. This suggests that the parallel trends assumption is over-satisfied. Hence, if these
trends continued, we should have seen lower anti-minority hate crimes in BJP states (than
in non-BJP states) after 2014. In fact, we see significantly higher anti-minority hate crimes
in BJP states (than in non-BJP states) after 2014 (see Figure 4). This suggest that the
increase in anti-minority hate crimes might have been caused by BJP’s victory in 2014. I
will now report on two sets of placebo tests to increase confidence in my results - one where
different years are used to define the Aftert dummy variable and another where hate crimes
against the majority religious group members are used as the dependent variable.
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Table 8: Testing Parallel Trends in the DD Model before
2014a
(1) (2) (3)
BJPs × TIME −0.176∗ −0.167 −0.329∗∗
(0.103) (0.111) (0.167)
Observations 140 140 140
State FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Time-Varying Controls Y Y
State Specific Trends Y
a OLS estimates of the model in (3) when the sample is
restricted to the years 2009–2013. BJPs is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 for states where BJP won the largest
share of popular votes in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, and 0
otherwise; TIME is a linear time treand that takes the value
0, 1, 2, . . . for t = 2009, 2010, . . .. Time varying controls: log
population, log per capita real net state domestic product,
log crime incidence. Standard errors are clustered by state
and appear in parentheses below parameter estimates.
Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent; ∗ 10
percent. The model was estimated with the lm.cluster()
function from the miceadds package (Robitzsch and Grund,
2019).
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5.2.5 Placebo Tests with Different Years
I have argued in this paper that the BJP’s electoral victory in 2014 is the crucial event that
has increased hate crimes against religious minorities. If this is true, then a before-after
comparison with years other than 2014, and especially before 2014, should not give me any
effect. I test this by running placebo tests, i.e. I estimate the DD model with full set of
controls and vary the AFTERt dummy variable
log(0.1 + hcst) = β(BJPs × AFTERt) + µs + δt + CONTROLS + εst. (4)
I estimate this model for 7 definitions of the Aftert dummy variable, and index each version
of the model with the year I use to define the Aftert dummy variable. For instance, in
Model-2011, AFTERt = 1 if year>= 2011, and 0 otherwise; in Model 2012, AFTERt = 1
if year>= 2012 and 0 otherwise; and so on. All models include the following controls: state
and year fixed effects; time varying controls (log PCNSDP, log population); pre-2014 controls
interacted with the Aftert dummy (urbanization, literacy rate, share of Muslim population);
and state-specific linear time trends.
In Figure 5, I plot the estimate of β for each model in (4) (indexed by the year), along
with the 95% confidence interval. In this figure, each model, other than for 2014, is a
placebo - because the crucial elections took place in 2014. Hence, we expect the effect to
be positive and strongest in 2014, and to be weak or non-existent in other years. From
Figure 5, we see that for 2011 and 2012, the effect is negative and statistically significant.
For 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, the effect is positive or close to zero but statistically insignificant.
It is only for the year 2014 that we have a positive effect that is statistically significant at






















Figure 5: Placebo tests for the treatment effect from the model in (4), where different years
are used to define the Aftert dummy variable. The dependent variable is log(0.1+hcst), where
hcst is the number of anti-minority hate crimes. The treatment group consists of states where
BJP won the largest share of popular votes in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. The y-axis gives
the year that was used to define the Aftert dummy. Thus, the year corresponding to 2014 is
the correct definition of the Aftert dummy, and the other years serve as placebos.
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5.2.6 Placebo Tests with a Different Religious Group
The hypothesis I have been investigating in this paper is that BJP’s electoral victory in 2014
lead to an increase in hate crimes against religious minorities. This comes from the under-
standing that BJP’s politics targets and demonizes religious minorities, especially Muslims.
This means that I should not find any effect if I use hate crimes against Hindus (who are
members of the majority religious community) as the dependent variable in the DD model.
To test this I run a placebo test again, i.e. I estimate the following DD model:
log(0.1 + hchst) = β(BJPs × AFTERt) + µs + δt + CONTROLS + εst (5)
where hchst is number of hate crimes against Hindus (majority religious community in India)
in state s in year t, and everything else is the same as in the basic DD model in (2). Table 9
presents estimates of β in the model in (5) for four different specifications. We see that the
coefficient is not statistically significantly different from 0 in any of the specifications. Thus,
the placebo test with hate crimes against the majority religious community further increases
confidence in my results.
5.3 Treatment Intensity Model
5.3.1 Motivation and Set-Up
Can we accept the results presented in the previous sub-sections as causal? Probably not.
That is because of at least two reasons. First, there might be reverse causality running
from hate crimes against minorities to the electoral fortunes of BJP. In the study of religious
riots, scholars have emphasized this causal link (Wilkinson, 2004; Iyer and Shrivastava, 2018).
Second, we cannot yet rule out the following scenario: some unobserved factors might have
caused both high BJP vote share in a state in 2014 and increase in anti-minority hate
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Table 9: Estimates of Treatment Effect from DD Model with Hate Crimes
Against Hindus (Majority Religious Community)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aftert ×BJPs 0.222 0.058 0.082 0.096 −0.067
(0.137) (0.127) (0.152) (0.188) (0.128)
Observations 280 252 252 224 224
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time-Varying Controls Y Y Y Y
Pre-Treatment Controls Y Y Y
Log-Crime Incidence Y
State Specific Trends Y
a OLS estimates of the treatment effect from the DD model in (5). The dependent
variable is log(0.1 + hchst), where hchst is the number of hate crimes against
Hindus (religious majority community) in state s and year t. BJPs is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 for states where BJP won the largest share of
popular votes in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, and 0 otherwise; Aftert is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for t ≥ 2014, and 0 otherwise. Time
varying controls: log population, log per capita real net state domestic product.
Pre-treatment controls (interacted with Aftert): urban population share,
literacy rate, share of Muslim population, all measured in 2011. Standard errors
are clustered by state and appear in parentheses below parameter estimates.
Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent; ∗ 10 percent. The model was
estimated with the lm.cluster() function from the miceadds package
(Robitzsch and Grund, 2019).
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crimes thereafter in that state. To address these concerns, I will now present estimates of a
treatment intensity model using an instrumental variable.
To estimate the relevant causal effect with an instrumental variables estimator, I will
estimate the following treatment intensity model:
log(0.1 + hcst) = β(BJP14V Ss × AFTERt) + µs + δt + CONTROLS + εst (6)
where all variables are the same as in the DD model in (2) other than the fact that we
have replaced the BJPs dummy variable (which defined the treatment group of states) with
BJP14V Ss, BJP’s vote share in state s in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, which now functions
as a continuous measure of treatment intensity. In the DD model in (2), we compared two
groups (BJP and non-BJP states) before and after 2014. In the treatment intensity model in
(6), every state becomes it own comparison group because we use the full variation in BJP’s
vote share across states.28 While I will estimate the treatment intensity model with OLS,
my preferred strategy will be to estimate it with an IV estimator where I will use BJP’s vote
share in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections as an instrumental variable for BJP14V Ss (BJP’s
vote share in 2014).
5.3.2 OLS and IV Estimates
Table 10 and 11 present OLS and IV estimates of the treatment effect in (6). In general
the OLS estimates are larger in magnitude than the IV estimates - suggesting the presence
of upward bias of OLS. To save on space, I will only comment on the IV estimates (from
Table 11). The first column presents the model with state and year fixed effects only; in
column 2, I add time-varying controls; in column 3, I add pre-2014 controls interacted with
the Aftert dummy; in column 4, I add the log of crime incidence; and in column 5, I add
28This method has been used in Card (1992).
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Table 10: OLS Estimates from Treatment Intensity Model for Hate Crimes
Against Religious Minoritiesa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aftert ×BJP14V Ss 0.029∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.029∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017)
Observations 280 252 252 224 252
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time-Varying Controls Y Y Y Y
Pre-Treatment Controls Y Y Y
Log-Crime Incidence Y
State Specific Trends Y
a OLS estimates of the treatment effect from the treatment intensity model in (6).
BJP14V Ss is the vote share won by BJP in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and is a
measure of treatment intensity; and Aftert is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 for t ≥ 2014, and 0 otherwise. Time varying controls: log population, log
per capita real net state domestic product. Pre-treatment controls (interacted with
Aftert): urban population share, literacy rate, share of Muslim population, all
measured in 2011. Standard errors are clustered by state and appear in
parentheses below parameter estimates. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1 percent level; ∗∗
5 percent; ∗ 10 percent. The model was estimated with the lm.cluster() function
from the miceadds package (Robitzsch and Grund, 2019).
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state-specific linear time trends but exclude log crime incidence. My preferred estimate
lies between the results for column 4 and 5. Using the lower value in column 4, the IV
estimation shows that the causal effect is statistically significant and its magnitude is 2.02%
(= 100 ∗ (exp(0.02) − 1)). Thus, if a state saw BJP winning 1 percentage point more vote
share in 2014, that would have caused an increase in average anti-minority hate crimes by
about 2.02%.
5.3.3 Is the Instrument Valid?
BJP’s vote share in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections is likely to be a good instrument for
BJP’s vote share in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections because it satisfies both the relevance
and exogeneity conditions. In terms of relevance, BJP’s state-level vote share in Lok Sabha
elections is quite persistent. That is why the vote share won by BJP in 2009 is a strong
predictor of the vote share it won on 2014.29 In Table 11, I have reported results of some
diagnostics for the IV estimator, where we can see that the F-statistic for the first stage
regression are all larger than 150, with corresponding p-values significantly smaller than
0.001. Hence, these results and the intuition about persistence of BJP’s vote share across
Lok Sabha elections suggests that there are no weak instrument problems. The instrument
strongly satisfies the relevance condition.
The exogeneity condition is of course more difficult to establish but equally crucial for
the validity of the IV estimates. To begin with, let us look at the diagnostics for the IV
estimator in Table 11 again. We see that the Wu-Hausman test is not able to reject the
null of no endogeneity in specifications 3,4 and 5. This suggests that including time-varying
controls and either log crime incidence or state specific linear trends substantially reduces
endogeneity problems. Of course, the Wu-Hausman test is only as good as the instrument. In
29The Pearson correlation coefficient between BJP’s state-level vote share in the two elections is 0.93.
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Table 11: IV Estimates from Treatment Intensity Model for Hate Crimes
Against Religious Minoritiesa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aftert ×BJP14V Ss 0.022∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.024∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
Observations 280 252 252 224 252
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time-Varying Controls Y Y Y Y
Pre-Treatment Controls Y Y Y
Log-Crime Incidence Y
State Specific Trends Y
First Stage (F-stat) 200.05 166.54 233.2 209.1 464.35
First Stage (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.002 0.062 0.177 0.997 0.296
a IV estimates of the treatment effect from the treatment intensity model in (6).
BJP14V Ss is the vote share won by BJP in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and is
a measure of treatment intensity; and Aftert is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 for t ≥ 2014, and 0 otherwise. BJP14V Ss is instrumented with
BJP09V Ss, BJP’s vote share in 2009 (the previous Lok Sabha elections). Time
varying controls: log population, log per capita real net state domestic product.
Pre-treatment controls (interacted with Aftert): urban population share,
literacy rate, share of Muslim population, all measured in 2011. Standard errors
are clustered by state and appear in parentheses below parameter estimates. The
null hypothesis of the Wu-Hausmann test is that the model suffers from the
problem of endogeneity. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent; ∗ 10
percent. The model was estimated with the ivreg function from the AER package
(Kleiber and Zeileis, 2008). Clustered standard errors were computed with the
vcovCR() function from the clubSandwich package (Pustejovsky, 2019).
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the final analysis, the exogeneity of the instrument can only be argued on intuitive grounds
- not on statistical grounds.
It is probably a valid concern that BJP’s vote share in 2009 might be correlated with
unobserved factors that are determinants of hate crimes against religious minorities. After
all it is not inconceivable that states where BJP won relatively high shares of the popular
vote in 2009 then saw the growth of right-wing Hindu nationalist organizations, which then
caused higher incidence of anti-minority hate crimes. While this narrative sounds apparently
plausible, it cannot stand scrutiny. If states with high BJP vote share in 2009 also saw growth
of factors that cause higher incidence of hate crimes against religious minorities, this should
have been manifested in the years between 2009 and 2013. It is difficult to see why such
forces, assuming they had been encouraged by the 2009 Lok Sabha election results, would
be dormant for four years and then suddenly come to the fore in and after 2014.
A counter argument might be that such forces would be dormant for the four years,
2009–13, because of instrumental reasons. Their utility is mainly to polarize the electorate
and garner votes for the BJP. Hence, it might be argued, that these forces might very well lie
dormant for four years and then make their appearance only during the Lok Sabha elections
in 2014. There are two problems in this argument. If such forces were to be instrumental
for winning votes for BJP by carrying out hate crimes against religious minorities - for
which there is much evidence when we consider religious riots (Wilkinson, 2004; Iyer and
Shrivastava, 2018) - then their actions should have occurred before, and not after, the 2014
elections. Since we do not see any effect in 2013, this argument cannot be valid.
But there is another problem with the instrumentality argument. Between two Lok Sabha
elections, elections to the state legislatures take place. If the 2009 elections had encouraged
forces that would ultimately increase anti-minority hate crimes, and that too for instrumental
reasons of the kind that is valid for religious riots, then incidents should have increased in
the years 2009–13 when many important state-level elections were held. Since we do not see
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any discernible increase in anti-minority hate crimes before 2014, this narrative is difficult
to sustain. Thus, on intuitive ground, the exogeneity assumption seems to be valid.
5.3.4 Placebo Tests
While intuition suggests validity of the instrument, as far as exogeneity goes, I also present
placebo tests of two kinds to further allay concerns. In Table 12, I present results of esti-
mating the treatment intensity model with IV for the sample before 2014. In this regression,
I try to measure the average difference in the incidence of anti-minority hate crimes for the
period, 2009–2013, that correlates with BJP’s 2014 vote share. I find no positive treatment
effect. In fact I find a negative effect, which provides support for my basic results.
In Table 13, I present results from re-estimating the treatment intensity model with IV on
the incidence of hate crimes against Hindus (members of the majority religious community).
I estimate this model for the full sample period, 2009–18, and find that there is no statistically
discernible positive impact of BJP’s 2014 vote share on the difference in hate crimes faced
by Hindus before and after 2014. If anything, the effect is negative. This is reassuring: the
rise of majoritarian politics is not expected to have any adverse impacts on members of the
majority community. And that is what I find. Taken together, therefore, the placebo tests
increase the confidence in my IV results of a causal impact of BJP’s electoral performance
in 2014 on the increase in anti-minority hate crimes.
5.4 Quasi-Poisson Regressions
The analysis presented so far has treated the incidence of hate crimes as a continuous random
variable and estimated models with OLS and IV. An alternative empirical strategy takes into
account an important characteristic of the incidence of hate crimes: that it is a non-negative
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Table 12: Testing Treatment Effect in the Treatment Intensity Model of Hate
Crimes Against Religious Minorities Before 2014a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BJP14V Ss × TIME −0.001 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 140 140 140 140 140
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time-Varying Controls Y Y Y Y
Pre-Treatment Controls Y Y Y
Log-Crime Incidence Y
State Specific Trends Y
a IV estimates of the treatment effect from the treatment intensity model with the sample
limited to years, 2009–2013. BJP14V Ss is the vote share won by BJP in the 2014 Lok
Sabha elections and is a measure of treatment intensity; and TIME is a linear time
treand that takes the value 0, 1, 2, . . . for t = 2009, 2010, . . .. BJP14V Ss, is instrumented
with, BJP09V Ss, BJP’s vote share in 2009 (the previous Lok Sabha elections). Time
varying controls: log population, log per capita real net state domestic product.
Pre-treatment controls (interacted with Aftert): urban population share, literacy rate,
share of Muslim population, all measured in 2011. Standard errors are clustered by state
and appear in parentheses below parameter estimates. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1 percent
level; ∗∗ 5 percent; ∗ 10 percent. The model was estimated with the ivreg function from
the AER package (Kleiber and Zeileis, 2008). Clustered standard errors were computed
with the vcovCR() function from the clubSandwich package (Pustejovsky, 2019).
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Table 13: Placebo Test of Treatment Intensity Model on Hate Crimes Against
Hindus (Majority Religious Community)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aftert ×BJP14V S 0.004 −0.00002 0.0003 −0.003 −0.007∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 280 252 252 224 252
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time-Varying Controls Y Y Y Y
Pre-Treatment Controls Y Y Y
Log-Crime Incidence Y
State Specific Trends Y
a Results of estimating the treatment intensity model with IV where the dependent
variable is log(0.1 + hchst), where hch is hate crimes against Hindus (the majority
religious community). The model includes all controls reported in the final column of
Table 10. Treatment intensity is captured by BJP14V Ss, BJP’s vote share in the
2014 Lok Sabha elections and is instrumented with BJP09V Ss, its vote share in the
previous Lok Sabha elections in 2009. Time varying controls: log population, log per
capita real net state domestic product. Pre-treatment controls (interacted with
Aftert): urban population share, literacy rate, share of Muslim population, all
measured in 2011. Standard errors are clustered by state and appear in parentheses
below parameter estimates. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent; ∗ 10
percent. The model was estimated with the ivreg function from the AER package
(Kleiber and Zeileis, 2008). Clustered standard errors were computed with the
vcovCR() function from the clubSandwich package (Pustejovsky, 2019).
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integer and not a real number. Taking this characteristic explicitly into account means
treating the dependent variable as a discrete random variable that only takes non-negative
integer values and using count data model. A popular version of count data models is the
Poisson regression model.(Greene, 2012, chapter 18) One restrictive feature of a Poisson
regression model is that it forces the mean and variance of the count variable to be equal.
In many cases this is unrealistic because the count variable has more variation than can be
captured by the mean - a situation known as ‘overdispersion’. For the number of hate crimes
against religious minorities, we see from Table 1 that the variance (3.8) is close to five times
the mean (0.78). A common way to deal with overdispersion is a quasi-Poisson approach,
and I use this approach in this paper (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989).30
In Table 14 and 15, I present results of estimating two versions of a quasi-Poisson regres-
sion model, without and with taking account of potential endogeneity, where the dependent
variable is the level of anti-minority hate crimes.31 For a standard quasi-Poisson regression
model, the dependent variable, hcst, is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution:
hcst ∼ Poisson(µst, θ),
where the mean µst > 0 is a function of covariates,
µst = exp [β(BJPV Ss × AFTERt) + µs + δt + CONTROLS] , (7)
and variance of the dependent variable is related to its mean as
V ar (hcst) = µstθ. (8)
30Another popular approach to dealing with overdispersion is to use a Negative Binomial regression. I
do not use this approach as, in my case, the negative binomial regression models could not be consistently
estimated. The iterative procedure to estimate parameters did not converge.
31In these models, I do not lose observations when the incidence of hate crime for any state-year observation
is 0. Hence, I do not need to add 0.1, as I did for my previous models.
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Table 14: Quasi Poisson Regression Model for Hate Crimes Against
Religious Minoritiesa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aftert ×BJP14V Ss 0.054∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 280 252 252 224
State FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Time Varying Controls Y Y Y
Pre-Treatment Controls Y Y
Log Crime Incidence Y
Memo:
Avg Marginal Effect 0.042 0.034 0.037 0.022
Std Error (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
a This table reports estimates of the treatment effect from a quasi Poisson
regression model in (7) and (8). The dependent variable is hcst, with hc
being the number of hate crimes against religious minorities. Treatment
intensity is captured by BJP14V Ss, BJP’s vote share in the 2014 Lok
Sabha elections; Aftert is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for
t ≥ 2014, and 0 otherwise. Time varying controls: log population, log
per capita real net state domestic product. Pre-treatment controls
(interacted with Aftert): urban population share, literacy rate, share of
Muslim population, all measured in 2011. The model parameters are
estimated by iterated reweighted least squares. Standard errors are
clustered by state and appear in parentheses below parameter estimates.
Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent; ∗ 10 percent. The
model was estimated with the glm.cluster() function from the
miceadds package (Robitzsch and Grund, 2019).
All the parameters of the model in (7) and (8), including the overdispersion parameter,
θ > 1, are estimated by the use of the iterated re-weighted least squares (IWLS) algorithm,
which has been shown to be equivalent to Fisher scoring and leads to maximum likelihood
estimates (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). In Table 14, I present results for the quasi-Poisson
treatment intensity model - which, in effect, ignores the possible problem of endogeneity of
BJP’s vote share.
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Table 15: Control Function Approach Estimates of Quasi Poisson
Regression Model for Hate Crimes Against Religious Minoritiesa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AftertXBJP14V Ss 0.042
∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
FSResidst 0.208
∗∗∗ 0.055 0.101 0.059
(0.070) (0.080) (0.075) (0.097)
Observations 280 252 252 224
State FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Time Varying Controls Y Y Y
Pre-Treatment Controls Y Y
Log Crime Incidence Y
a This table reports estimates of the treatment effect from a quasi Poisson
regression model in (7) and (8) that has been estimated with a control
function approach. The dependent variable is hcst, with hc the number of
hate crimes against religious minorities. Treatment intensity is captured
by BJP’s vote share in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and is instrumented
with its vote share in the previous Lok Sabha elections in 2009.
FSResidst refers to the residual from the first stage regression, estimated
by OLS, of Aftert ×BJP14V Ss on Aftert ×BJP09V Ss with the full
set of controls. In the second stage, the residual is included as an
additional regressor and the Poisson model estimated by iterated
reweighted least squares. Time varying controls: log population, log per
capita real net state domestic product, log crime incidence.
Pre-treatment controls (interacted with Aftert): urban population share,
literacy rate, share of Muslim population, all measured in 2011. Standard
errors are clustered by state and appear in parentheses below parameter
estimates. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent; ∗ 10
percent. The model was estimated with the glm.cluster() function
from the miceadds package (Robitzsch and Grund, 2019).
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To address the problem of endogeneity, I use a control function approach (Wooldridge,
2015). In the first stage of the control function approach, I regress Aftert ×BJP14V Ss on
Aftert × BJP09V Ss, where BJP14V Ss and BJP09V Ss are BJP’s vote share in the 2014
and 2009 Lok Sabha elections, respectively, and the full set of controls. I then include the
residual from the first stage as an additional regressor in the second stage model, which is the
quasi-Poisson regression model (7) and (8). In Table 15, I present results for the treatment
treatment intensity model where I address the possible problems of endogeneity of BJP’s
vote share with a control function approach.
The estimates in Table 14 are all positive and significant, much along the lines of the
linear model discussed thus far. When we turn to Table 15, we see that the first stage residual
is not significant once we include controls - which is what we also saw for the Wu-Hausman
test in Table 11. Once that is the case, the estimates from the basic quasi-Poisson and
the control function quasi-Poisson model give very similar estimates. Thus these estimates
confirm the results of the linear specification used earlier in this paper: there is an increase
in hate crimes against religious minorities due to BJP’s electoral performance in 2014.
To interpret the results, I have computed average marginal effects (AMEs) of Aftert ×
BJP14V Ss and reported them in the bottom panel in Table 14. All the AMEs are positive
and statistically significant. If we use the last column in the table, which is the model with
the full set of controls, we see that the AME is 0.022. This means that for every percentage
point increase in BJP’s popular vote share in 2014, hate crimes against religious minorities
increase by the multiple 1.022(= exp(0.022)), i.e. hate crimes against religious minorities
increase by about 2.2% for every percentage point of BJP’s 2014 vote share (which is close
to the IV estimate in column 5, Table 11). However, I prefer to use the linear models for the
discussion because parameters are easier to interpret in such models.
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6 Three Mechanisms
Having established the causal impact of BJP’s electoral victory in the 2014 Lok Sabha
elections on the incidence of anti-minority hate crimes, I would now like to investigate three
possible mechanisms that might be driving the result.
6.1 Mechanism 1: State-level Law Enforcement
In India, law & order is a state subject under the seventh schedule of the Constitution.
This means that state governments are primarily responsible for preventing, detecting, in-
vestigating and prosecuting crimes. Since hate crimes are incidents that are prima facie
recognized as crimes under the Indian Penal Code, law & order relating to such incidents
are also the responsibility of state governments. One way in which BJP’s electoral victory in
the 2014 Lok Sabha elections might have increased anti-minority hate crimes is by adversely
impacting law enforcement efforts related to hate crimes against religious minorities.32 To
investigate this possible mechanism, I use three variables.
The first variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if BJP is part of the
government at the state level in any year, and 0 otherwise. The idea behind using this
variable is that BJP’s presence in a state government would have a larger adverse impact
of BJP’s electoral victory in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections on law enforcement related to
hate crimes against religious minorities than if BJP was not part of the state government.
Key state-level ministers of BJP might be able to, directly and indirectly, influence law
enforcement officials - which they would not be able to do without being part of the state
government.
The second variable is the charge sheeting rate for all crimes covered by the Indian Penal
Code (IPC). This measures the proportion of true reports of IPC crimes submitted to the
32This mechanism has been highlighted in the political science literature on religious riots in India (Wilkin-
son, 2004; Basu, 2015).
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police that are converted into charge sheets submitted by the police. Hence, this captures the
efficacy of the policing administration as far as it relates to filing charge sheets about crimes.
If BJP’s electoral victory in 2014 negatively impacted law enforcement, then this variable
would capture some of that effect. But this variable is less than perfect for my purpose. This
is because BJP’s electoral victory is likely to differentially impact law enforcement related
to crimes committed against persons that BJP’s ideology demonises. Hence, the charge
sheeting rate for all crimes might not capture the effect of interest. To address this concern,
I use the third variable: the charge sheeting rate by the police for all crimes against schedule
caste (SC) persons covered by the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Scheduled Tribes (STs), are among the most socio-economically
disadvantaged groups in India. Traditional Hindu society has considered SCs as ‘untouch-
ables’ and consigned them to the margins of society. Centuries of discrimination and
marginalization has accumulated into significant socio-economic disadvantages for the SCs.
BJP’s ideology has a dual approach to SCs. On the political front, it tries to include SCs
in the construction of a unified Hindu bloc against the Muslim other; on the social front,
it has seldom challenged the discrimination and violence faced by SCs from Hindu society.
Hence, if BJP’s electoral victory in 2014 adversely impact law enforcement at the state level,
that impact can be expected to have a differential impact on crimes committed against SCs.
The charge sheeting rate by the police for crimes committed against SCs by non-SC/STs,
which are explicitly covered by the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is meant to
capture this differential impact.
6.2 Mechanism 2: Economic Competition
In an influential study of communal riots in India, Mitra and Ray (2014) show that relative
economic prosperity of Muslims leads to violence against them by Hindus. In section II of the
paper, Mitra and Ray (2014) review a large literature in history and political science, many
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of these case studies, that had highlighted the role of economic competition in religious, i.e.
Hindu-Muslim, riots in India. The paper takes “the economic argument a step further” by
constructing a formal model of religious conflict and testing the implications of the model
with a region panel data set. Their key empirical finding is that “an increase in Muslim
prosperity is positively associated with greater religious fatalities in the near future, while
the opposite is true of a change in Hindu prosperity.” (pp. 742).
The implication of the historical and contemporary evidence summarised in Mitra and
Ray (2014) for my study is that one possible mechanism behind the rise in anti-minority hate
crimes could be the relative prosperity of religious minorities, especially Muslims. I capture
this possible mechanism underlying the causal impact identified in the previous sections of
the paper using four variables. The first two variables are the poverty rates (head count ratio)
of Hindus and Muslims in 2009–10 (Panagariya and Mukim, 2014). The next two variables
are the proportion of Hindus and Muslims who attained a level of formal education that was
higher secondary or above in 2011–12. By including the poverty rate and higher education
attainment of both Muslims and Hindus, I hope to capture the effect of relative prosperity
of Muslims - as compared to Hindus - and thereby to test for the economic competition
mechanism studied in Mitra and Ray (2014).
6.3 Mechanism 3: Role of Social Media
A recent literature has highlighted the role of social media is spreading rumours and sus-
taining hate campaigns against marginzalized and vulnerable segments of the population.
Mu¨ller and Schwarz (2018) study the relationship between anti-refugee sentiment on Face-
book and hate crimes against refugees in Germany. The authors find “that anti-refugee hate
crimes disproportionally increase in areas with higher Facebook usage” during periods of
high anti-refugee sentiments on Facebook (which they measure by looking at posts on the
Facebook page of the right-wing political party, AfD). Mu¨ller and Schwarz (2019) study the
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role of social media is generating and sustaining anti-Muslim sentiments in the US and the
role of the latter in physical acts of violence against Muslims. Using county level variation
in Twitter penetration over time, they find that “Trump’s tweets about Muslims are highly
correlated with the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes, but only for the time period after the
start of his presidential campaign.” This result obtains in an instrumental variable strategy
too - leading them to conclude that social media might very well have a role to play in the
recent rise of anti-minority violence in the US.33
This body of literature suggests another possible mechanism for the causal impact of
BJP’s electoral victory in 2014 on the subsequent increase in anti-minority hate crimes in
India. It has been widely commented that the BJP is far ahead of all other political parties
in India in terms of social media usage. For instance, The Economic Times reported on
May 16, 2019 that BJP was the top spender on political ads on Google and Facebook.34
Sam and Thakurta (2019) document the important ways in which BJP’s electoral campaign
in 2014 relied on social media. To test if social media plays an important role in the rise
in anti-minority hate crimes that can be associated with BJP’s electoral victory in 2014, I
use information on the total number of subscriptions to telecom wireless. If social media
has a role to play in sustaining anti-Muslim sentiments, then its salience will increase with
the proportion of Hindus in a state. Hence, I interact the total number of telecom wireless
subscribes in a state-year with the share of Hindus in the state in 2011.
6.4 Results on Mechanisms
In Table 16 and 17, I present results of testing the efficacy of each of the three mechanisms
separately. Columns 1 and 2 test the state-level law & order mechanism; columns 3 and 4 test
33Edwards and Rushin (2018) also find evidence of an increase in hate crimes after Donald Trump’s election




the economic competition mechanism; and columns 5 and 6 test the social media mechanism.
For each of these mechanisms, I present both OLS and IV estimates from estimating the
treatment intensity model in (6). The results in Table 16 control for state-specific linear
time trends (but exclude the log incidence of crimes) and the results in Table 17 control for
the log incidence of crime (but exclude state-specific linear time trends). The results are
qualitatively and quantitatively similar. So, I will only comment on the results in Table 16.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 16, I take the treatment intensity model in (6) with the full set
of controls, including state-level linear time trends, and add three variables to capture state-
level law enforcement: a dummy variable for whether BJP is part of the state government;
the charge sheeting rate for all IPC crimes; the charge sheeting rate for crimes committed
by non-SC/STs on SCs that are covered by the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
When I estimate the model by OLS, the coefficient capturing the continuous treatment
effect is 0.035 and is significant at the 10% level. When I estimate the model by using
BJP’s vote share in 2009 as the instrument for BJP’s vote share in 2014, the magnitude
of the coefficient reduces to 0.030 and it is no longer statistically significant at even then
10% level. This suggests that the adverse effect of BJP’s electoral victory in 2014 on state-
level law enforcement is an important mechanism for increasing hate crimes against religious
minorities.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 16, I present results for testing the importance of the
mechanism of economic competition. I take the treatment intensity model in (6) with the
full set of controls, including state-level linear time trends, and add four variables, each of
them interacted with the Aftert dummy variable, to capture economic competition between
Hindus and Muslims (the largest religious minority group in India): poverty rate of Hindus
in 2009-10; poverty rate of Muslims in 2009-10; proportion of Hindus with higher secondary





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































above in 2011-12. The OLS estimate of the treatment effect is 0.053 and the IV estimate
is 0.047, and both are significant at the 5% level. Thus, while economic competition might
very well play a role, it does not seem to be the main mechanism at work.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 16, I present results for testing the social media mechanism.
Again, I take the treatment intensity model in (6) with the full set of controls, including
state-level linear time trends, and add a variable to capture the role of social media: total
telecom wireless subscribers in a state-year interacted with the share of Hindus in a state in
2011. The OLS estimate of the treatment effect is 0.058 and the IV estimate is 0.049, and
both are significant at the 5% level. I conclude that while social media might be important,
it is unlikely to be the main mechanism at work with regard to anti-minority hate crimes.
7 Discussion, Caveats and Conclusions
In the Indian parliamentary elections in 2014, the right-wing Hindu nationalist BJP won a
massive and unprecedented victory - an absolute majority of parliamentary seats for the first
time in independent India’s history. The year 2014 has also seen a marked rise in hate crimes
against religious minorities. Since BJP’s core politics is unmistakably majoritarian and
exclusivist in orientation, with Muslims functioning as the prime ‘other’, it is natural to ask
if the two - BJP’s rise to dominance in 2014 and an increase in hate crimes against religious
minorities, especially Muslims - are causally linked. In this paper, I have investigated this
question empirically with a unique data set constructed from a recently formed citizen’s
religious hate crime watch website. Using a difference in difference research design, I find
that BJP’s rise to political dominance caused a significant increase in the incidence of hate
crimes against religious minorities.
My sample has information on 28 states (27 states and the national capital territory of



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































empirical analysis, I compare 5-year periods before and after the 2014 election and find that
in the treatment group of states (where BJP was the winner of the largest share of popular
votes in 2014), hate crimes against religious minorities increased by 544% more than in the
control group of states (where BJP was not the winner of the largest share of popular votes
in 2014). I show that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied. Placebo tests with different
years for defining the ‘after’ dummy variable and on hate crimes faced by the majority
community members show no results.
When I use a treatment intensity approach, where BJP’s vote share in 2014 is used
a the treatment intensity variable and is instrumented by its vote share in the 2009 Lok
Sabha elections, I find that every percentage point increase in BJP’s vote share caused hate
crimes against religious minorities to increase by 2.02%. An analogue of the parallel trends
assumption is satisfied, and placebo tests - like in the previous model - show no effects. I
also use a quasi Poisson regression - where the count data nature of hate crimes is explicitly
taken into account - and get results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those
from the linear models. Taken together, this evidence allows me to conclude that BJP’s
electoral performance in 2014 caused an increase in hate crimes against religious minorities.
An election is a way in which information about attitudes, in this case anti-Muslim
attitudes, can be thought to be aggregated (Bursztyn et al., 2017; Schilter, 2019). Thus,
BJP’s spectacular electoral victory in 2014 sent a signal to those holding strong anti-Muslim
sentiments that such sentiments were widely held in society. Since the election campaigns
by key BJP leaders had demonised and vilified Muslims, its victory made it acceptable to
verbally and physically attack Muslims. Since key political leaders did not strongly condemn
such attacks and law enforcement officials were lax, it reinforced the attacks on Muslims by
creating and sustaining a culture of impunity. It is this social atmosphere that encouraged
violent, and often lethal, attacks on Muslims across India. I test three ways in which this
general process might create mechanisms for the increase in anti-minority hate crimes: (a)
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slack in State-level law enforcement; (b) rising economic competition between Muslims and
Hindus; and (c) the role of social media in facilitating such violence. I find strongest evidence
for the ‘State-level law enforcement’ mechanism.
The most important limitation of the analysis presented in this paper relates to the quality
of data on the incidence of religion-motivated hate crimes. The data that I have used in
this research was collected from newspaper reports by a citizen’s initiative (CRHCW). While
there is a long tradition in the social sciences to use data collected from newspaper reports,
especially related to violence against marginalized social groups, there is no doubt that such
data come with many problems. Since the data only includes cases that are reported in
the media, this is different from the actual number of incidents that might have occurred.
After all, not all incidents get reported in the news media. There might also be issues of
differential coverage across states and years. I hope that the different ways in which I have
tried to control for confounding factors would at least partly deal with biases arising from
these obvious data problems. Ideally, one would have liked to check trends from the CRHCW
data with trends generated by official data - as was done in Krueger and Pischke (1997) -
but official data on religion-motivated hate crimes is not available in India.
This analysis points to several avenues for future research. First, it is clear that the
phenomenon studied in this paper is a worldwide one - marginalized minorities have been
under attack in many countries across the world (for instance, see the March/April 2019 issue
of Foreign Affairs on ‘The New Nationalism’). Hence, a comparative analysis across countries
might throw light on some of the important dimensions of the problem. Second, what we
are witnessing in India today has obvious parallels to the phenomenon of lynching seen in
other parts of the world in earlier periods, like early 20-th century USA and South Africa.
Hence, the comparative lens might be fruitfully extended to cover not only other countries
today but earlier periods as well. Third, the social and political impact of anti-minority
violence on members of the larger minority community needs to be studied. There is some
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evidence that right-wing rhetoric against Muslims in the US has had chilling effects on the
community, and they have withdrawn from the public sphere (Hobbs and Lajevardi, 2019).
Is the same phenomenon - of Muslims retreating from the public sphere - also happening in
India?
The issues analyzed in this paper has important policy and political implications. Tak-
ing note of the growth in the disturbing phenomena of mob violence, cow vigilantism and
lynching of minorities, the Supreme Court of India in 2018 had directed the Central and
State governments to enact measures to put an end to what it called “horrendous acts of
mobocracy”.35 In July 2019, the Law Commission of the state of Uttar Pradesh published
a suo motto report and a draft bill to deal with the phenomenon of lynching.36 Recently,
the Congress government in the state of Madhya Pradesh has made some changes in ex-
isting laws to deal more firmly with cow vigilantism,37 and the Congress government in
Rajasthan has promised to enact fresh legislation to check mob lynching and hate crimes.38
Expressing concern at the rising wave of anti-minority lynching, many prominent people and
celebrities in India recently wrote to the Prime Minister of the country to take decisive and
swift action.39 How best to deal with such a serious problem that is gravely undermining
the democratic republic of India is a question all Indian citizens have to engage with seriously.
35Source: The Washington Post, 17 July, 2018 (internet edition). (link)
36Source: The Wire, 12 July, 2019. (link)
37Source: The Hindustan Times, 27 June, 2019 (internet edition). (link)
38Source: The Hindustan Times, 17 July, 2019 (internet edition). (link)
39Source: The Times of India, 24 July (internet edition). (link)
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Appendix A
In this appendix, I provide details about all the variables used for the analysis in this paper.
• Incidence of religion-motivated hate crime (number): The data on this variable was
manually collected from the CRHCW website.
• Vote share won by BJP in the 2014 and 2009 Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament)
elections: The data for these variables are taken from the website of the Election
Commission of India.
• Incidence of crime (number): This variables gives the incidence (number) of crimes
covered by the Indian Penal Codel (IPC). These data are collected from: (1) Table 1.5,
Crime in India 2013 ; and (2) Table 1A.1, Crime in India 2016. The publication, Crime
in India, is an annual publication of the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) of
the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. It is one of the main sources for
information on crime-related matters in India.
• Estimated mid-year population (lakhs): The data on this variable come from various
issues of Crime in India. The NCRB, in turn, takes the data on population from the
Registrar General of India.
• Per capita net state domestic product (NSDP) at 2011-12 prices (rupees): The data on
this variable are taken from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 2018-19,
an annual publication of the Reserve Bank of India.
• Literacy rate in 2011 (%): The literacy rate is defined as the ratio of the literate
population aged 7 years and above divided by the total population aged 7 years and
above. This definition has been used in the Censuses since 1991, and is known as the
effective literacy rate. Data on this variable is taken from the Census of India, 2011.
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• Share of urban population in 2011 (%): The urbanization rate is the share of total
population residing in urban areas. An urban unit can be of two types. It is defined as a
statutory town if it has a municipality, corporation, cantonment board or notified town
area. It is defined as a census town if it satisfies either of the following characteristics:
(a) it has a minimum population of 5000; (b) At least 75 per cent of the male main
workers are engaged in non-agricultural pursuits; (c) population density is at least 400
per square kilometers. Data on this variable is taken from the Census of India, 2011.
• Share of Muslim population in 2011 (%): The variable measures the share of Muslims
in a state’s population in 2011. Data on this variable is taken from the Census of
India, 2011.
• Poverty rate (HCR) of Muslims in 2009-10 (%): The head count ratio of Muslims below
the poverty line in 2009-10 using the Tendulkar poverty line. Data on this are taken
from Table 16 in Panagariya and Mukim (2014).
• Poverty rate (HCR) of Hindus in 2009-10 (%): The head count ratio of Hindus below
the poverty line in 2009-10 using the Tendulkar poverty line. Data on this are taken
from Table 16 in Panagariya and Mukim (2014).
• Proportion of Muslims with higher secondary education and above in 2011-12 (%): This
variable gives the proportion of Muslims in a state with higher secondary education
and above, which includes: higher secondary; diploma/certificate course; graduate;
and postgraduate and above. Data on this variable are taken from NSSO (2016, Table
S3.10, pp. 99).
• Proportion of Hindus with higher secondary education and above in 2011-12 (%): This
variable gives the proportion of Hindus in a state with higher secondary education and
above, which includes: higher secondary; diploma/certificate course; graduate; and
71
postgraduate and above. Data on this variable are taken from NSSO (2016, Table
S3.10, pp. 99).
• Charge sheeting rate for all IPC crimes (%): This variable measures the charge sheeting
rate in police disposal of IPC (Indian Penal Code) crimes committed against all persons.
The variable is defined as charge sheets submitted by the police divided by true reports
submitted to the police, expressed as a percentage. Data on this variable is available
for all years in my sample, other than 2018, and is available in the following tables in
the publication, Crime in India: Table 4.2. for 2009 to 2015, and in Table 17A.2 for
2016 and 2017. Crime in India is an annual publication of the National Crime Records
Bureau (NCRB) of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.40
• Charge sheeting rate for all crimes against SCs covered by the SC/ST Prevention
of Atrocities Act, 1989 (%): This variable measures the charge sheeting rate in police
disposal of crimes committed against Scheduled Caste persons by non-Scheduled Caste
persons. All such cases are covered by the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989.
The variable is defined as charge sheets submitted by the police with reference to such
cases divided by true reports submitted to the police with reference to such cases,
expressed as a percentage. Data on this variable is available for all years in my sample,
other than 2018 and is taken from Table 7.4 in the publication Crime in India.
• Wireless telecom subscribers (million): This variable measures the total number of
wireless telecom subscribers. Data on this variable is available for all years in my sample
and is taken from Telecom Statistics India 2018 (pp. 24–41), an annual publication of




• Whether BJP is part of the State Government (Yes=1;No=0): This is a dummy vari-
able that takes the value 1 if the BJP is part of the state government, and 0 otherwise.
Data on this variable is constructed for each year using information from the website
of the Election Commission of India, and reports in the news media.
Appendix B
The data on the incidence of religion-motivated hate crimes used for the analysis in this
paper was collected from the Citizen’s Religious Hate Crimes Watch (CRHCW) website in
the second week of August 2019. On September 12, 2019, the Indian news forum, Scroll,
reported that the CRHCW website had been taken down on 1 September 2019. The report
in Scroll shows a screenshot of the CRHCW website, when it was operational.41 Figure 6
shows the screenshot of the webpage that was generated when I tried to access the CRHCW
website on 13 November, 2019. The screenshot shows that the website can no longer be
accessed.
[FUGURE 6 about here]
The CRHCW website was awarded the data journalism awards in 2019 “for best data
journalism team portfolio (small newsroom)”.42 The detailed reporting about this award to
the CRHCW website can be still accessed.43 This report provides vital information about
the CRHCW website and the citizen’s project that created the website. For instance, it tells
us why the website was created, the definition of a hate crime, the methods used to collect
the data, and the impact it had on public discussions on the issue of religious-based crimes
against minorities.
About the method used to collect data, this is what the website says:




...over a period of six months, we collated reports of hate violence from the
English language online and print media. Each incident was then subjected to a
test–to establish whether it fits the definition. These incidents were then cross-
verified from other media sources to assimilate the full extent of facts, and to
include information on any progress in the investigation and/or prosecution of
the attacks.44
At the bottom of the page, there is a video interview about the website with Mohsin
Alam Bhatt, Assistant Professor, Jindal Global Law School, who seems to have been part
of the CRHCW project.
A report generated on the WayBack Machine about the CRHCW website shows that
the website was crawled by the WayBack Machine 7 times between 15 November, 2018 and
31 August, 2019. The CRHCW website has not seen any activity since 31 August, 2019.45
When the CRHCW website was active, the data it made available was used widely in the
national and international media. Here are some prominent examples:
• The Washington Post, 31 October 2018
• The New York Times, 18 February 2019
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